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Abstract
This Article examines the extent of human rights protection under the Constitution of the Re-
public of Poland of April 2, 1997 (”new Polish Constitution” or “Constitution”), adopted on April
2, 1997, by the Polish National Assembly and approved by the Polish people in a referendum on
May 25, 1997. The Constitution, a lengthy document composed of 243 articles, came into force
on October 17, 1997, and is one of the last constitutions to be adopted in Central and Eastern
Europe since the start of the political and socio-economic transformations of the post-communist
era. This Article emphasizes the importance of the new Polish Constitution in light of the long
tradition of constitutionalism in Poland. Part I surveys some of the earlier constitutional texts,
with particular focus on the provisions concerning the protection of human rights. After briefly
discussing the difficulties encountered in drafting the new Polish Constitution, Part II analyzes the
protection of rights and freedoms in the Constitution in light of the most recent developments.
This part focuses on the general principles underlying rights and freedoms in the Constitution,
certain prominent civil and political rights of particular importance in their specific Polish context,
the debate surrounding the constitutionalization of economic and social rights, the protection of
so-called ”third-generation rights” such as the right to a clean and healthy environment, and lim-
itations on rights and freedoms. One section is also devoted to the mechanisms adopted for the
implementation and enforcement of these rights. This Article concludes that the system of pro-
tecting human rights in the new Polish Constitution is innovative and far-reaching and can serve
as a useful model for developments elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the extent of human rights protection
under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April
19971 ("new Polish Constitution" or "Constitution"), adopted on
April 2, 1997, by the Polish National Assembly and approved by
the Polish people in a referendum on May 25, 1997.2 The Con-
* Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of Leicester, England. This Article
uses the following Polish abbreviations for Polish political parties: AWS - Akcja
Wyborcza Solidarnosc [Election Action Solidarity]; ROP - Ruch Odbudowy Polski [The
Movement to Rebuild Poland]; SLD - Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [Democratic Left
Alliance]; PSL - Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Polish Peasant Party]; UW - Unia
Wolnosci [Freedom Union]; UP - Unia Pracy [Labour Union]; BBWR - Bezpartyjny
Blok Wspierania Reform [Non-party Coalition Supporting Reforms]; KPN - Konfeder-
acja Polski Niepodleglej [Confederation for an Independent Poland]; PC -
Porozumienie Centrum [Understanding of the Center]; PP - Porozumienie Prawicy
[Understanding of the Right]; PPS - Polska Partia Socjalistyczna [Polish Socialist
Party]; NSZZ Solidarnosc [Solidarity Senators]; and KSN - Klub Senator6w
Niezaleznych [Club of Independent Senators]. The English translations provided in
brackets above are mainly based on those used in the University of Chicago journal,
EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [hereinafter EECR].
1. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. [Constitution of
the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997] DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 78,
Item 483 (1997) [hereinafter POL. CONST. (1997)]. The official Polish text of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 ("new Polish Constitution" or "Con-
stitution") and an English translation is published in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE CotmrrIuES
OF THE WORLD at binder XV (Albert P. Blaunstein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1997).
2. The Constitution was adopted by the Polish National Assembly-both the Lower
House ("Sejm") and Upper House ("Senate") of Parliament sitting together-on April
2, 1997, by a vote of 451 to 40. The parties voting in support of the Constitution were
the SLD, UW, PSL, and UP. See 4-te Posiedzienie Zgromadzenia Narodowego, 2
kwietnia 1997 r., Nr 162 (285) II kadencja [Fourth Session of the National Assembly, 2
April 1997, No. 162 (285), 2nd Term] [hereinafter Fourth Session of the National As-
sembly]; M. Tanska, 25 Maja Referendum Konstytucyjne [Constitutional Referendum of the 25
May], ZyciE WARsZAWV, Apr. 3, 1997 (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.zw.com.pl/>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (English translation is the author's
own); Constitution Watch: Poland, 6 EECR No. 1, 20, 20 (1997). The Constitution was
approved in a referendum on May 25, 1997, gaining the support of 52.7% of voters,
with 45.9% voting against the adoption of the basic law. Of more significance, however,
was the low turnout, with only 42.9% of those eligible to vote taking part in the referen-
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stitution, a lengthy document composed of 243 articles, 3 came
into force on October 17, 1997, and is one of the last constitu-
dum. Gisbert H. Flanz, The Republic of Poland: Introductory & Comparative Notes, in CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at vii. Sejm Deputy Tadeusz
Mazowiecki (UW), a chief architect of the new basic law, attributed the general lack of
interest surrounding the Constitution to its belated adoption, arguing that it would
have received speedier societal approbation and would have been met with enthusiasm
if it had been adopted in the years 1989 to 1990. 3-cie Posiedzienie Zgromadzenia
Narodowego, 24-28 lutego 1997 r., Nr 157 (280) II kadencja [Third Session of the Na-
tional Assembly, 24-28 February 1997, No. 157 (280), 2nd Term] [hereinafter Third
Session of the National Assembly]; see Wiktor Osiatynski, A Brief History of the Constitu-
tion, 6 EECR Nos. 2-3, 66, 68 (1997); Ewa Letowska, A Constitution of Possibilities, 6 EECR
Nos. 2-3, 76, 77 (1997). Connected to this view is the argument that the politicization
of the constitution-making process stimulated neither the interest of citizens in the ba-
sic law nor trust in its framers and resulted in a reluctance to participate. See P. Aleksan-
drowicz, Nie latwo mdwic o wlygranych [Difficult to Talk about Winners], RZECZPOSPOLITA,
May 26, 1997 (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.rzeczpospolitica.pl> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (English translation is the author's own).
The low turnout led politicians to the right of the political spectrum to question
the referendum's legitimacy because it did not secure the participation of at least 50%
of voters. Indeed, an action to invalidate the referendum on this ground was consid-
ered but rejected by the Polish Supreme Court. A. Lukaszewicz, Referendum jest wazne
[The Referendum is Valid], RZECZPOSPOLITA, July 16, 1997. Moreover, these politicians
contended that the final text, drawn up by the Constitutional Commission of the Na-
tional Assembly-dominated by the SLD-PSL left-wing coalition, UP and UW-did not
come about as a result of a genuine compromise because no account was taken of the
views of those groups outside of the Sejm. See, e.g., Senator Alicja Grzeskowiak (NSZZ
Solidarnosc) and Sejm Deputy Adam Slomka (BBWR and KPN), Third Session of the
National Assembly, supra (statements of Sen. Alicja Gizeskowiak (NSZZ) and of Sejm
Deputy Adam Slomka (BBWR). Moves, however, to include an alternative draft in the
May 1997 referendum to the one prepared by the Constitutional Commission, known
as the Citizens' Draft (projekt obywatelski), were unsuccessful. See Third Session of the
National Assembly, supra (statement of Slavian Krzaklewski, representative of the au-
thors of the Citizens' Draft). Marian Krzaklewski, the leader of the trade union NSZZ,
is now also the leader of Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnose (AWS), the largest party in the
Polish Sejm, composed of a plethora of centre-right and rightist parties.
3. The new Polish Constitution is unusually long compared with other post-com-
munist constitutions. See Flanz, supra note 2, at viii. In introducing the final constitu-
tional draft, the Rapporteur of the Constitutional Commission, Sejm Deputy Marek
Mazurkiewicz (SLD), recognized that it was extensive, but only moderately so when
compared to the fundamental laws of other European countries. Third Session of the
National Assembly, supra note 2. However, others viewed the Constitution as too
"wordy" or "talkative" and argued that it should have been shorter, more concise, and
restrained. See, e.g., Krzysztof Kozlowski (KD) and Piotr Chojnacki (PSL), Third Session
of the National Assembly, supra; M. Nowicki, Straz praw [The Guardian of Rights], ZYcIE
WARszAwv, Oct. 18, 1997; Prof. Ryszard Malajny, Faculty of Law, University of Leicester,
Faculty Seminar, General Characteristics of the New Polish Constitution, Oct. 27, 1997. More-
over, Professor Malajny argues that some constitutional provisions are so vague that
they contain little if no legal value. See Malajny, supra (referring to Article 1 of the new
Polish Constitution, which reads: "The Republic of Poland is the common good of all
its citizens".).
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tions to be adopted in Central and Eastern Europe since the
start of the political and socio-economic transformations of the
post-communist era.4 This Article emphasizes the importance of
the new Polish Constitution in light of the long tradition of con-
stitutionalism in Poland. Part I surveys some of the earlier con-
stitutional texts, with particular focus on the provisions concern-
ing the protection of human rights. After briefly discussing the
difficulties encountered in drafting the new Polish Constitution,
Part II analyzes the protection of rights and freedoms in the
Constitution in light of the most recent developments. This part
focuses on the general principles underlying rights and free-
doms in the Constitution, certain prominent civil and political
rights of particular importance in their specific Polish context,
the debate surrounding the constitutionalization of economic
and social rights, the protection of so-called "third-generation
rights" such as the right to a clean and healthy environment, and
limitations on rights and freedoms. One section is also devoted
to the mechanisms adopted for the implementation and en-
forcement of these rights. This Article concludes that the system
of protecting human rights in the new Polish Constitution is in-
novative and far-reaching and can serve as a useful model for
developments elsewhere.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUAD: THE PLACE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN POLISH CONSTITUTIONS
FROM 1791-1989
A. The Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791
Polish constitutionalism has a lengthy and rich, but arduous
history.5 The first Polish constitution, the Act of Governance of
4. Constitutions were adopted in the other central and eastern European coun-
tries on the following dates: Bulgaria, July 12, 1991; the Czech Republic, December 16,
1992; Romania, November 21, 1991; Slovakia, September. 1, 1992; and Slovenia, De-
cember 23, 1991. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at
binders III, V, XVI, XVII. The only country in this region still to adopt a brand new
constitution is Hungary. The basic law of Hungary is Act XX of 1949, which was
amended substantially in 1990 and 1994. Id., at binder VIII. For an overview of the
position in Hungary with particular reference to the constitutional protection of funda-
mental rights, see Gabor Halmai, The Protection of Human Rights in Poland and Hungary,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 149, 157-65 (I. Pogany ed., 1995).
5. For an excellent overview, see Mark F. Brzezinski, Constitutional Heritage and Re-
newal: The Case of Poland, 77 VA. L. REV. 49 (1991). For the purpose of this Article,
constitutionalism is understood broadly as the mechanisms existing within a state that
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3 May 17916 ("1791 Polish Constitution"), is often compared to
other famous constitutions of that epoch, namely the U.S. and
French constitutions. 7 While the practical impact of this docu-
ment was severely limited by the loss of Polish independence
shortly after its adoption, its importance as a symbol of Polish
identity and sovereign nationhood, enabling Poles to retain their
culture and values during the long years of oppression, is gener-
ally emphasized.'
Although a rudimentary notion of rights and freedoms9 as a
means of limiting governmental power took early root in Poland,
particularly in relation to the landed gentry (szlachta ziemianie), it
took some time for other social classes to be granted comparable
protection. Clearly, this gradual process was hardly assisted by
the 125 years of foreign occupation to which the country was
subjected between 1793 and 1918, partitioned among Austria,
Prussia, and Russia.1 ° In contrast to the U.S. and French consti-
tutions, in which rights were proclaimed with much fanfare after
controls or limits the organs of government. See A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (8th ed. 1997).
6. Ustawa Rzadowa z dnia 3 Maja 1791 [Act of Government of 3 May 1791] [here-
inafter POL. CONST. (1791)].
7. Indeed, it is traditionally regarded as the first modern European constitution,
preceding by four months the French Constitution of September 3, 1791. See Hubert
Izdebski, Constitutional Development in France and Poland Since 1791: A Comparative Analy-
sis, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICA, POLAND, AND FRANCE 163, 164
(Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 1991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION-
ALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS]. For a more negative assessment of the Act of Government
of 3 May 1791 ("1791 Polish Constitution"), see M. Hillar, The Polish Constitution of May
3, 1791: Myth and Reality, 37 POLISH REV. 185, 185 (1992) (stating that it was "a last
effort to save the old feudal system").
It is a mistake to put the Polish Statute on the same level with the Ameri-
can Constitution, with its Bill of Rights, or the French, with its Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The latter documents broke with tradi-
tional feudal ways, abolished a hereditary class structure of society, broke with
ecclesiastical domination by separating state and church, and introduced abso-
lute freedom of conscience.
Id. at 187.
8. See, e.g., WenceslasJ. Wagner, May 3, 1791, and the Polish Constitutional Tradition,
36 POLISH REv. 383, 395 (1991); Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 69.
9. For an overview of the protection of human rights in Poland from 1791 to 1988,
see Leslaw Kanski, Human Rights in Poland from a Historical and Comparative Perspective, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 121.
10. One commentator writes: "External forces, notably the unfortunate tendency
of Poland's neighbours to occupy it, have precluded a smooth and consistent constitu-
tional history in Poland." Andrzej Balaban, Developing a New Constitution for Poland, 41
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 503, 503 (1993).
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bloody revolutions,11 and which are recognized as the forerun-
ners of modern bills of rights, the 1791 Polish Constitution was a
product of evolution rather than revolution' 2 and thus took a
more guarded approach to the protection of rights and free-
doms. With the exception of religious freedom, which was
granted to everyone,' 3 the only genuine rights, as understood in
the modern sense, were conferred upon the landed gentry
(szlachta ziemianie), 4 the ruling class in Poland at the time.
Some limited entitlements were also granted to the townspeople
or burghers (mieszczanie), 5 and to the peasantry (chlopi wlos-
cianie). 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1791 Polish Con-
stitution was heralded as the first step in an evolutionary process
to be completed by the adoption of three other "national consti-
11. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,
(France 1789), reprinted in JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261 (1992).
12. See Hubert Izdebski, Konstytucja Trzeciego Maja wsr6d konstytucji swojego wieku
[The Constitution of May 3rd 1791 Amongst the Constitutions of the Period], 46 PANSTWO I
PRAwo, No. 5, at 3, 9-10 (1991). The English translations of the article titles are those
provided by the journal. Professor Izdebski observes that this process was described by
Hugo Kollataj, one of the framers of the 1791 document, as the "gentle revolution"
(lagodna rewolucja), id. at 5, and argues that an important value of this document was its
attempt to create a state structure, within the framework of the "gentle revolution," that
sought more to rationalize rather than to discard national traditions, id. at 6.
13. See Article I of the 1791 Polish Constitution, which nonetheless also made it
clear that Roman Catholicism was to be the dominant religion. POL. CONST. (1791) art.
1. With regard to Catholics who wished to change their faith, the provision declared
that "[p]assage from the dominant religion to any other confession is forbidden under
penalties of apostasy," which at that time meant banishment. See Hillar, supra note 7, at
200. Hillar goes on to provide a critical review of so-called "traditional Polish toler-
ance." Id. at 200-02. The prevalent view, however, would appear to be that persecution
of other creeds was never as widespread in Poland as in other countries. See Brzezinski,
supra note 5, at 67 n. 108 (citing ADAM ZAMovsiu, THE POLISH WAY 90-91 (1987)).
14. POL. CONST. (1791) art. II (rights to personal security, liberty, and property).
The landed gentry (szlachta ziemianie), made up 10% of the Polish population at the
time. It is noteworthy that the szlachta ziemianie had already been guaranteed rights to
personal liberty as far back as 1430 by means of the Cracovian Privilege, which pre-
vented the King from detaining or sentencing a member of the szlachta ziemianie before
a court could rule on the matter. This doctrine, known as neminem captivabimus, pre-
ceded by over 200 years the essentially similar English Habeaus Corpus Acts of 1679 and
1816. See Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 53.
15. POL. CONST. (1791) art. III (rights to personal liberty and the inviolability of
town property) (incorporating earlier law passed by same Sejm entitled, "Our free
Royal Cities in the states of the Republic" [Miasta Nasze Krolewskie wolne w panstwach
Rzeczypospolite] of April 18-21, 1791); see Izdebski, supra note 12, at 15. Hillar observes,
however, that this law did not apply to non-royal towns, which predominated in Poland
at the time. Hillar, supra note 7, at 203.
16. POL. CONST. (1791) art. IV (urging respect for agreements reached between
landowners and peasants).
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tutions," including an "economic constitution," which would
have moved Poland away from a feudal society towards a modern
state extending additional rights to those who were not members
of the ruling class, and in particular to the peasantry.."v
B. The Years of Partition and the Polish Constitutions of
March 17, 1921 and April 23, 1935
Rights and freedoms were bestowed equally upon everyone
by the Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw of 22 July 18078
("1807 Polish Constitution"), which was imposed by Napoleon
after his defeat of Prussia in 1807 in setting up a Polish state in
the part of Prussia that had previously belonged to Poland. 9
The genuine constitutional protection of rights and freedoms,
however, only became firmly established in the Constitution of
the Republic of Poland of 17 March 192120 ("1921 Polish Consti-
tution"), two and one half years after Poland had regained her
17. See Izdebski, supra note 12, at 13, 15. The other two "national constitutions"
were to be the moral (educational) and the legal (codification of the Polish and Lithua-
nian law) constitutions. Izdebski, supra note 7, at 165. Indeed, a broad range of indi-
vidual rights was extended to peasants in the Polaniec Manifesto of May 7, 1794, drawn
up by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, with the aim of encouraging the peasantry to participate in
the uprising of that year, which failed in November. See Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 69-
70 (citations omitted).
18. Ustawa Konstytucyjna Ksiestwa Warszawskiego z dnia 22 lipca 1807 r. [Constitu-
tional Law of the Duchy of Warsaw of 22 July 1807] DZIENNIK PRAW [JOURNAL OF LAWS]
Nos. 1, 2, 16 (1807-1810) [hereinafter POL. CONST. (1807)].
19. The Constitutional Law of the Duchy of Warsaw of 22 July 1807 ("1807 Polish
Constitution") ensured the equal application of laws and abolished the serf class as a
legal institution. POL. CONST. (1807) art. 4. Although this constitution was short-lived
due to Napoleon's defeat by Russia, it has been argued that "the egalitarian principles
inherent in the Napoleonic system would remain an important part of Polish constitu-
tional thought." See Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 70-71 (footnotes omitted). A new con-
stitution was imposed.by Russia in 1815. See Ustawa Konstytucyjna Kr6lestwa Polskiego z
dnia 27 listopada 1815 r. [Constitution Law of the Kingdom of Poland of 27 November
1815], DZIENNIK PRAW [JOURNAL OF LAWS] 1815-1816 T.1 No. 1, 1824-1825 T.9 No. 37
[hereinafter POL. CONST (1815)]. This constitution also contained a relatively liberal
set of rights that were, however, effectively ignored in practice. See Kanski, supra note 9,
at 124 (citation omitted).
20. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 17 marca 1921 r. [Constitution of
the Republic of Poland of 17 March 1921], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAWS] No. 44,
Item 267, No. 52, Item 334 (1921) [hereinafter POL. CONST. (1921)]. For an overview
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 17 March 1921 ("1921 Polish Constitu-
tion") and its place in the context of constitutions adopted after World War I, see P.
Sarnecki, Konstytucja Marcowa na tle konstytucji wspdlczesnych (w siedemdziesiata rocznice)
[The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of March 17, 1991 against a Background of Contem-
porary Constitutions], 46 PANSTWO i PRAwo, No. 3, at 5 (1991).
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independence. This constitution guaranteed a host of human
rights and freedoms, including a range of economic and social
rights. 21 The 1921 Polish Constitution, however, also opted for a
strong parliamentary system of government, conferring the most
significant powers upon the legislative branch,22 a formula that
was largely blamed by the President, Marshal J6zef Pilsudski, for
the government corruption and the political and economic
chaos that followed. This state of affairs led to a presidential
coup d'etat on May 11, 1926, after which the 1921 Polish Constitu-
tion was amended on August 2, 1926, to strengthen the execu-
tive branch of government. The 1921 Polish Constitution was
eventually replaced by the Constitutional Law of 23 April of
193523 ("1935 Polish Constitution"), in which presidential pow-
ers were increased considerably and in which fundamental rights
and freedoms, though present, received far less prominence.24
21. See POL. CONST. (1921) § V (General Duties and Rights of Citizens). For eco-
nomic and social rights, see Articles 102 to 103 of the 1921 Polish Constitution (employ-
ment and social security rights) and Articles 117 to 119 (educational rights). As noted
by Kanski, the insertion of these rights into the 1921 Polish Constitution followed the
introduction of extensive social legislation. Kanski, supra note 9, at 125. Kanski con-
cludes that the "regulations concerning social and economic rights [reveal] ... that the
stress laid on the so-called economic rights was not characteristic only of socialist states"
and argues that the emphasis on these rights was a result of the adoption in Poland of
the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 125-26. Sarnecki observes,
however, that the inclusion of some economic and social rights in the 1921 Polish Con-
stitution was rather modest in comparison to the broader conception of these rights
found in other constitutions adopted at that time, such as those of the new Weimar
Republic (1919), Yugoslavia (1921), and Lithuania (1922). Sarnecki, supra note 20, at
8.
22. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report of the Constitu-
tional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 595, 623-24 (1991) (describ-
ing traditional preference of Polish people for powerful legislature). This preference
was first manifested in the existence of the liberum veto, which enabled a single member
of the Sejm to veto proposed legislation and which was abolished by Article VI(2) of the
1791 Polish Constitution. Although the liberum veto was often considered as an example
of Polish disorder and anarchy, Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, the renowned historian and
presently Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has argued that for 200 years this principle
worked well and that it underlines the existence of a long parliamentary tradition in
Central Europe. Parliamentarism in Central Europe: A Speech by Bronislaw Geremek, 4 EECR
No. 3, 43, 44 (1995) (delivered at University of Chicago Law School on December 1,
1994).
23. Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 23 kwietnia 1935 r. [Constitutional Law of 23
April 1935], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws], No. 30, Item 227 (1935) [hereinafter
POL. CoNsT. (1935)].
24. Article 5(2) of the Constitutional Law of 23 April 1935 ("1935 Polish Constitu-
tion") guaranteed the right of citizens to develop their personal values and rights to
freedom of conscience, speech, and association. See Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 72-86
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C. The Communist Constitution of July 22, 1952
After World War II, the Interim Constitution of February
19, 194725 was based to some extent on the 1921 Polish Constitu-
tion, but did not incorporate the chapter on citizens' rights.
The Sejm, instead, issued a declaration respecting the basic
rights and freedoms of citizens, which stipulated rather omi-
nously in its final provision that these rights and freedoms could
not be used against the state's political system.26  Although
human rights, including civil and political rights, did find a
place in the Soviet-style constitution adopted on July 22, 1952,
the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic of 22 July
195227 ("1952 Polish Constitution"), they were phrased in a
vague and programmatic manner and could not be judicially en-
forced by individuals. Moreover, statutes were to determine the
extent of the restrictions to which these rights could be subject.28
(providing overview and assessment of inter-war period in Poland from constitutional
standpoint); see also Leszek L. Garlicki, The Presidency in the New Polish Constitution, 6
EECR Nos. 2-3, 81, 81 (1997) (providing overview of Polish Presidency from its incep-
tion in 1921 to its present place in new Polish Constitution).
25. Ustawa konstytucyjna z dnia 19 lutego 1947 r. o ustroju i zakresie dzialania
najwyzszych organ6w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitutional Law of 19 February 1947
relative to the Organization and Scope of Activity of the Supreme Authorities of the
Republic], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 18, Item 71 (1947) [hereinafter
POL. CONST. (1947)] (also known as "Small Constitution").
26. See Kanski, supra note 9, at 129. The Declaration of Rights and Liberties, ap-
proved by the Sejm on February 22, 1947, stated that "the abuse of the civil lights and
liberties for the purpose of overthrowing the democratic form of government of the
Republic of Poland, shall be prevented by law." Id.
27. Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej z dnia 22 lipca 1952 r. [Consti-
tution of the Polish People's Republic of 22 July 1952], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF
LAws] No. 33, Items 232, 233 (1952), ch. VIII (Basic Civil Rights and Duties) [hereinaf-
ter POL. CONST. (1952)]. One commentator, writing in 1987, observed that "[t] he loca-
tion of the chapter indicates the low significance attached to its subject matter; the
chapter is followed only by three others dealing with issues of marginal importance."
See Stanislaw Frankowski, The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as the Palladium of Individ-
ual Rights and Liberties-The Case of Poland, 61 TULANE L. Riv. 1307, 1313 (1987). More-
over, the following important rights and freedoms were omitted from the Constitution
of the Polish People's Republic of 22 July 1952 ("1952 Polish Constitution"): the right
to be free from torture and slavery; the right to privacy; the right to freedom of move-
ment and travel, including the right to choose one's place of residence; the right to
property; the right to organize trade unions and the right to strike; the right to informa-
tion; the right to citizenship; the right to participation in government and self-govern-
ment; and the right to an effective remedy for the violation of basic rights and free-
doms. See Wiktor Osiatynski, A Bill of Rights for Poland, 1 EECR No. 3, 29 (1992);
Frankowski, supra, at 1314.
28. See Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 95; Kanski, supra note 9, at 129-30. As Frankow-
ski observed in 1987: "The language used [in Chapter VIII of the 1952 Polish Constitu-
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Indeed, it has been noted that "the progression from the social-
ist concept of rights to post-communist constitutionalism lies pri-
marily in the realm of protection. '29 Most importantly, however,
the enumeration of these rights in the 1952 Polish Constitution
could hardly have been a meaningful exercise given "the reality
of political terror" in Stalinist Poland. ° In 1976, amendments to
the 1952 Polish Constitution recognized the prevailing political
reality in Poland at the time by inscribing into the text the "lead-
ing role" of the Communist Party and the special role of the So-
viet Union in Polish affairs.3
D. The Constitutional Reforms of the 1980s
The need to give more effective protection to human rights
and civil liberties was sharply illustrated in the rise of the trade
union movement-"Solidarity"-the origins of which were
deeply rooted in the denial of a whole range of human rights
and freedoms. A declaration of the movement explained that:
Our union was born out of protest of the Polish society which
experienced violations of human and civil rights for over
three decades; [it was born] from the protest against discrimi-
nation on the basis of inner convictions and against the sys-
tem of economic exploitation. It was a rebellion against the
existing system of governing. . .. We were not only con-
cerned with living conditions .... History has taught us that
there is no bread without freedom. We were also concerned
with the justice, democracy, the truth, the Rule of Law,
tion] clearly suggests that constitutional rules are not intended to recognize or confer
any enforceable rights to the citizens of Poland, but are meant to express purported
policy goals." Frankowski, supra note 27, at 1313
29. Wiktor Osiatynski, Rights in the New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 111, 111 (1994).
30. Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 596. In this context, see also Article 84(3) of the
1952 Polish Constitution (as amended), which effectively prevented the exercise of
rights and liberties in a manner contrary to the interests of the Polish state, which reads:
"Creation of and participation in associations whose aim or activities are directed
against the political and social system, or against the legal order, of the Polish People's
Republic are forbidden." POL. CONST. (1952) art. 84(3), cited in Frankowski, supra note
27, at 1314.
31. DZIENNIK USTAW LJOURNAL OF LAws] No. 7, Item 36 (1976), arts. 3(1), 6(2), cl.
2; see Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 596-97. The amendments also introduced addi-
tional economic and social rights, such as the right to "leisure and rest" (art. 69) and
the right to education (art. 72), as well as a so-called "third-generation right," namely
the right to benefit from the natural environment (art. 71). See Rapaczynski, supra, at
597.
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human dignity, the freedom of thought, . . . not only with
bread, butter, and sausage. All basic values were too de-
graded to believe that without their being restored, anything
could be changed for the better. An economic protest had to
be at the same time a social protest; a social protest had to be
also a moral one.32
Although the "Solidarity" era was short-lived, and the union
was banned with the introduction of martial law on December
13, 1981, the momentum for change remained relentless, and
the Polish Communist government introduced some democratic
reforms in the 1980s. Western-type liberal institutions were su-
perimposed upon the existing socialist structures33 such as the
High Administrative Court,34 the Constitutional Tribuna3 5 (or
"Tribunal"), the Tribunal of State, 6 and the Commissioner for
32. Extracts from the Declaration, Kim jestesmy i dokad dazymy? [What Is Our Plat-
form?], adopted during the first Solidarity National Congress in October 1981, repro-
duced in TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC [SOLIDARITY WEEKLY], 1981, cited in Frankowski (1987),
supra note 27, at 1310; see Brzezinski, supra note 5, at 98 n.345.
33. For a good succinct description of the role of these institutions, see Brzezinski,
supra note 5, at 99-103, and Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Polish Constitutional
Law, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN 21, 27-29,
44-46 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephan III eds., 1995). The following institu-
tions are now endorsed by the new Polish Constitution: the High Administrative Court
(arts. 184-85); the Constitutional Tribunal (or "Tribunal") (arts. 188-97); the Tribunal
of State (arts. 198-201); and the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights (or "Commis-
sioner") (arts. 208-12).
34. Ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1980 r. o Naczelnym Sadzie Administracyjnym oraz
zmianie ustawy-Kodeks Postepowania Administracyjnego [Law of 31 January 1980 on
the High Administrative Court and on Amending the Code of Administrative Proce-
dure], DZIENNIK USTAW UOURNAL OF LAws] No. 4, Item 8 (1980). The High Administra-
tive Court has the power to review individual administrative decisions, but not parlia-
mentary statutes. See Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 33, at 27.
35. Constitutional Amendment of 26 March 1982, art. 33a. The Constitutional
Tribunal, however, only began to function at the beginning of 1986 after legislation
implementing Article 33a was adopted. See Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 1985 o Trybunale
Konstytucyjnym [Constitutional Tribunal Act of 29 April 1985], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOUR-
NAL OF LAWS] No. 22, Item 98 (1985); Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial
Review in Post-Communist Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13,
24 (1995) (providing in-depth analysis of Constitutional Tribunal and its growing influ-
ence in Poland). For an earlier analysis, shortly after the introduction of the Tribunal,
see Leszek Garlicki, Constitutional Developments in Poland, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 713
(1988). The Tribunal, including its more expansive role under the new Polish Consti-
tution, is discussed in more detail below in Part III, Section G on Implementation and
Enforcement.
36. Constitutional Amendment of 26 March 1982, art. 33b. This body has been
described as a "quasi-judicial impeachment court," whose members are elected by the
Sejm and presided over by the President of the Supreme Court. It adjudicates criminal
responsibility for constitutional and statutory violations committed by state officials in
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Citizens' Rights (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich).7 Despite these re-
forms, the status of rights and freedoms in Poland in the second
half of the 1980s was described very skeptically by Prof. Stanislaw
Frankowski. He wrote that "Communist Poland is not a country
governed by the rule of law in the Western sense. Citizens' polit-
ical rights and liberties are illusory. Consequently, effective
mechanisms for their enforcement have no ratio existendi." 3
The same author, however, also observed somewhat propheti-
cally that these new institutions had the potential to take on a
democratic life of their own,39 and indeed, this appears to have
occurred. The relevance and role of these bodies for the en-
forcement of the rights and freedoms of individuals under the
new Polish Constitution, particularly the Constitutional Tribunal
and the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, is discussed below in
Part III, Section G on Implementation and Enforcement.
II. DRAFTFING RIGHTS IN THE NEW POLISH
CONSTITUTION: 1989-1997
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe
left economic and social devastation in its wake. This devastation
has been eloquently described by historian, Prof. Norman Da-
vies:
The legacy of Soviet-style economies was dire. Despite in-
itial successes, such as the currency reform and the conquest
of hyperinflation under Poland's Balcerowicz Plan (1990-91),
it became painfully clear that no overnight remedy was to
their official capacities. Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 33, at 28; see Garlicki, supra
note 35, at 721-24.
37. Ustawa z dnia 15 lipca 1987 r. o Rzeczniku Praw Obywatelskich [Law of 15July
1987 on the Commissioner of Citizens' Rights], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAWS]
No. 21, Item 123 (1987); see Ewa Letowska, The Ombudsman and Basic Rights, 4 EECR
No. 1, 63 (1995) (overview of work of the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, written by
first such commissioner (1988-1992)); see also Ewa Letowska, The Polish Ombudsman (The
Commissioner for the Protection of Civil Rights), 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 206 (1990). The
present Commissioner is Adam Zielinski, a professor of law at Warsaw University, who
replaced Tadeusz Zielinski (1992-1996) on May 8, 1996. Constitution Watch: Poland, 5
EECR No. 16, 18 (1996). The term of service of the Commissioner has been increased
to five years under the new Polish Constitution. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 209(1).
38. Frankowski, supra note 27, at 1337.
39. Id. at 1338 ("It is conceivable that in a different political climate, the guardian
[ombudsman] (and some other institutions created by General Jaruzelski's govern-
ment, such as the Constitutional Tribunal) may be transformed into genuinely autono-
mous bodies protecting the citizen from state power.").
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hand. All the former members of the [Eastern] bloc faced
decades of agonizing reorganization on the way to a viable
market economy....
Everywhere, the social attitudes engendered by commu-
nism persisted. Embryo civil societies could not rush to fill
the void. Political apathy was high; petty quarrels ubiquitous;
residual sympathy for communism as a buffer against unem-
ployment and surprises was greater than many supposed.
The decades 'under water' had conditioned the masses to dis-
believe all promises and to expect the worst. The cynical idea
that someone loses if someone else is gaining was all but in-
eradicable. No one could have guessed the dimensions of the
devastation.4 °
Given this legacy, the construction of a democratic culture in the
former Eastern Bloc was, and continues to be, a very difficult
task, and the success of this process is by no means assured.
Consequently, this "lack of certainty as to the success of the pro-
cess of building democracy in a post-communist world" is one
important reason that has been posited for the need to entrench
human rights protections in East Central Europe swiftly as a
means of limiting the power of future authorities, whether dem-
ocratic or dictatorial.4 1 Poland, however, did not adopt a new
constitution as quickly as many of the other central and eastern-
European countries.4 2 Indeed, it took eight years for the final
40. Norman Davies, Europe: A History 1125 (1996). The particular economic ob-
stacles facing Poland were described as follows: "The noncommunist governments that
ruled Poland from 1989 to 1993 faced the formidable task of restructuring the national
economy under two handicaps: first, the huge external debt, amounting to 65% of
GNP, left by the Communist elite of the 1970s; second, the general recession in the
world economy that prevented the mass economic assistance needed when Commu-
nism surrendered." SeeJacek Kurczewski, The Politics of Human Rights in Post-Communist
Poland, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 4, at 125.
41. Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 114. For the dangers of majority democratic rule
to the protection of individual and minority rights in this region, see generally Jon
Elster, On Majoritarianism and Rights: Today, as in the 18th Century, Constitutions Must
Protect Individual Rights from the Excesses of Democracy, 1 EECR No. 3, 19 (1992).
42. As observed by Rapaczynski, "the experience of the drafting [in Poland] brings
to the fore the most fundamental problem facing the constitution makers of Eastern
Europe: the fact that the new constitution must be prepared at a time of profound and
rapid changes in the political and economic structure of the country." Rapaczynski,
supra note 22, at 630. In the light of this statement, it is somewhat paradoxical, there-
fore, that constitutions were adopted quickly in countries such as Bulgaria and
Romania where the political and economic difficulties require the most significant
transformations. See Halmai, supra note 4, at 151.
Indeed, it has been argued that there are inherent advantages in delaying the con-
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document to be adopted in a referendum. 43 "The mingling of
the Constitution with ordinary politics was the cardinal reason
for its repeated delays in Parliament. Because the drafting pro-
cess took place in the lion's den of daily politics, the very legiti-
macy of the framers was repeatedly called into question.""
A number of other reasons, both political and practical,
have also been put forward for this delay.45 Moreover, three
stitution-making process under such conditions. See Stephen Holmes, Back to the Draw-
ing Board: An Argument for Constitutional Postponement in Eastern Europe, 2 EECR No. 1,
21, 22 (1993) (stating that "there are good reasons to think that a drawn-out process of
constitution-making, with false starts and half steps, where constitutional committees
proceed by trial and error and go periodically back to the drawing board, has great
advantages under present conditions"). Indeed, this view was echoed by the Polish
President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who stated that the initial failed attempts to adopt a
new constitution in Poland after 1989 had enabled the constitution-makers to prepare a
better and more mature text because they were in a position to take into account the
positive and negative experiences of the previous eight years of political and economic
transformations. Fourth Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (speech by
Pres. Kwasnrewski to National Assembly).
43. For a fascinating account of the work of the Constitutional Committee (1990-
1991) of the first post-1989 Sejm, see Rapaczynski, supra note 22. For an account of the
painstaking constitutional drafting process up to Spring 1994, see Wiktor Osiatynski,
(Special Report), Poland's Constitutional Ordeal: Avoidable and Unavoidable Detours on the
Path to Reform, 3 EECR No. 2, 29 (1994). The procedure for adopting a new Polish
Constitution was laid out in Ustawa konstytucyjna z dnia 23 kwietnia 1992 o trybie
przygotowania i uchwalenia Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Constitutional Act of
23 April 1992 on the Procedure, Preparation and Adoption of a Constitution for the
Republic of Poland], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 67, Item 336 (1992).
This act created a Constitutional Commission (or "Commission"), composed of 46 Sejm
deputies, ten Senators, and non-voting representatives of the President, Government,
and the Constitutional Tribunal. The function of the Constitutional Commission was
to consider drafts submitted to it, to draw up its own draft, and then to send this docu-
ment to the National Assembly. After considering the Commission's draft in two read-
ings, the National Assembly could adopt the constitution if it obtained the support of a
two-thirds majority in the presence of at least half of the members. If the President
proposed amendments, however, a third reading would have to take place. Adoption of
presidential amendments required an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at
least half the members. The National Assembly could then adopt the constitution as a
whole by a two-thirds majority. See Interim Constitution Approved in Poland, I EECR No. 2,
12 (1992); Ryszard Malajny, The Constitution Making Processes in Eastern European Coun-
tries, PRAWA CZLOWEKA , - HUMANISTYCZNE ZEsz'YTY NAUKOWE [HUMAN
RIGHTS-HUMANISTIC SCIENTIFIC FASCICLES] No. 4, at 18-19 (1997).
44. Osiatynski, supra note 2, at 66.
45. Professor Malajny identifies the following six reasons for constitutional delay,
which can be applied not only to Poland, but also to the other central and eastern-
European countries: the passing of significant amendments to old constitutions pro-
foundly changing the political and socio-economic system; the overloading of Parlia-
ments with essential legislation; the weakness of the democratic forces after the over-
throw of Communism, the lack of talent of their political leaders, and the general polit-
ical immaturity of central and eastern-European societies; the fragmentation of
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elections in the burgeoning democracy4 6 and unexpected
changes in government 47 were hardly conducive to the climate
of constitution-making. Significant constitutional measures,
however, were passed earlier so that the correct conditions could
be created in Poland for political and economic reform. These
measures were adopted in the form of amendments to the social-
ist 1952 Polish Constitution. The most important amendments
were passed on April 7, 1989, December 29, 1989, and the in-
terim "Small Constitution" of October 17, 1992.48 In summary,
the 1989 constitutional changes introduced a two-chamber Par-
liament consisting of the Sejm and the Senate, instituted the of-
fice of the President, and removed the formulations of commu-
nist ideology, replacing them with the principles of a democratic
state of law and freedom of economic activity.4" The "Small Con-
stitution" clarified the relations between the legislative and exec-
utive branches of government. The Sejm ceased to be the
supreme body in the state and became, together with the Senate,
merely the national legislature. The executive was divided be-
tween the Cabinet, which gained a number of powers, and the
President, with the latter playing the role of a strong umpire. A
compromise was also reached between the President and the
parliaments leading to counterproductive factional disputes; the dilemma over the most
appropriate system of government (whether it should be presidential or parliamen-
tary); and the problem of adequate socio-economic rights. Malajny, supra note 43, at
14-17; see Part III.D (Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights).
46. Malajny, supra note 3.
47. For example, the downfall of the government in December 1995, after it was
alleged that the Prime Minister, J6zef Oleksy, had collaborated with Russian intelli-
gence services and further delayed the work of the Constitutional Commission. See Con-
stitution Watch: Poland, 5 EECR No. 1, 16-17 (1996).
48. Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypos-
politej Ludowej [Law of 7 April 1989 Amending the Constitution of the Polish People's
Republic], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 19, Item 101 (1989); Ustawa z dnia
29 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej [Law of 29
December 1989 Amending the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic], DZIENNIK
USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 75, Item 444 (1989); Ustawa konstytucyjna z 17
pazdziernika 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach miedzy wladza ustawodawcza i
wykonawcza Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorzadzie terytorialnym [Constitutional
Act of 17 October 1992 on the Relations Between the Legislative and Executive
Branches in the Republic of Poland and on Local Self-Government], DZIENNIK USTAW
LJuORNAL OF LAWS] No. 84, Item 426 (1992) [hereinafter Constitutional Act of 17 Octo-
ber 1992].
49. See Anna Michalska &Jan Sandorski, Remarks on the Place of International Human
Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 19 POLISH YBIL 101, 102 (1991-1992).
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Sejm in regard to the appointment of the Cabinet."°
None of these changes, however, contained a bill of rights.
Consequently, the rights catalogue in the 1952 Polish Constitu-
tion remained in force,5 a position described at the time as "a
fundamental deficiency of Poland's . . . constitutional frame-
work. '52 This lacuna was all the more troubling given the signifi-
cance of human rights to the Polish opposition to communist
rule.53 There were, however, attempts to introduce a bill of
rights during this period. A Charter of Rights and Freedoms
("draft Charter of Rights" or "draft Charter") was submitted to
the Sejm as a draft constitutional enactment by the former Presi-
dent, Lech Walesa, on November 12, 1992.1' The draft Charter
has secured praise as making an important contribution to the
50. See Special Report, Poland Has a New Constitution as Conflict Between Two Cham-
bers of Parliament Continues, 1 EECR No. 3, 12, 12 (1992).
51. Constitutional Act of 17 October 1992, supra note 48, art. 77. As noted by
Halmai, however, the amendments to the 1952 Polish Constitution in December 1989
did introduce a provision protecting private property (art. 7), which was recognized
both as being an integral aspect of the transition to a market economy and as a funda-
mentally important requirement for attracting foreign investment. Halmai, supra note
4, at 153-54.
52. Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 33, at 47. As noted by Brzezinski and Gar-
licki, however, this lack of a new comprehensive framework to protect individual rights
and freedoms was mitigated somewhat by three developments: the December 1989
changes to the first chapter of the 1952 Polish Constitution on "Basic Principles of the
Political Structure" to include basic democratic principles; ratification by Poland of the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"); and the many legislative changes
introduced by Parliament affecting individual rights and freedoms, such as laws improv-
ing political rights and changes to criminal procedure enhancing due process guaran-
tees. Id. at 48-49.
On January 19, 1993, Poland ratified the ECHR, which was signed on November 4,
1950, and which entered into force on September 3, 1953, and accepted the right of
individual petition (art. 25) on May 1, 1993. See Halmai, supra note 4, at 153.
53. Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 122.
54. For overviews of this document, see Osiatynski, supra note 27; Andrzej Rzeplin-
ski, The Polish Bill of Rights and Freedoms: A Case Study of Constitution-making in Poland, 2
EECR No. 3, 26 (1993); Michalska & Sandorski, supra note 49, at 126-31; Halmai, supra
note 4, at 152-57; and Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 33, at 47-48. The bill of rights
had its origins in the work of three members of the Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights-Marek Nowicki, Marek Antoni Nowicki, and Andrzej Rzeplinski-a non-gov-
ernmental organization ("NGO") monitoring the Polish government's compliance with
the Helsinki Final Act since 1982. The text of the Helsinki Final Act is reproduced in
From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process 43-100 (A. Bloed ed., 1990).
The original authors were later joined by Ewa Letowska, Poland's first Commissioner
for Citizens' Rights, and Wiktor Osiatynski. See Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 30. A com-
peting draft Charter on Social and Economic Rights, sponsored by SLD, was rejected by
the Sejm. See Constitution Watch: Poland, 2 EECR No. 1, 8, 8 (1993). Both charters were
considered by the Sejm at the beginning of 1993. For an interesting analysis of the
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debate in Poland on the constitutionalization of rights," and sig-
nificant aspects of the draft Charter make their mark in Chapter
II of the new Polish Constitution.
III. THE NEW POLISH CONSTITUTION
A. Human Rights in Context
Despite the political bickering and intrigue surrounding the
adoption of the new Polish Constitution, what all political parties
seemed to agree upon was the need to protect human rights.56
The part of the Constitution concerned with the protection of
human rights and freedoms is Chapter II. The importance ac-
corded to rights and freedoms in this constitution is reflected in
the proportion of articles in Chapter II to the Constitution as a
whole. This chapter is the largest section in the Constitution
with fifty-six out of 243 articles.57 It is important to place Chap-
ter II in its context within the Constitution. The concept of
human rights permeates the whole document. The Preamble
contains three paragraphs accenting the bitter human rights ex-
periences of the past, making a firm commitment for the future,
and underlining the fundamental significance of human rights
principles to the Polish constitutional framework. The Preamble
states that:
Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fun-
damental freedoms and human rights were violated in our
Fatherland,
Desiring to guarantee the rights of the citizens for all
time and to ensure diligence and efficiency in the work of
public institutions, ....
We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution
for the good of the Third Republic, to do 'so paying respect to
the inherent dignity of the person, his (or her) right to free-
dom, the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for
these principles as the unshakable foundation of the Repub-
lic of Poland.5"
ideological differences that emerged during the debate, see Kurczewski, supra note 40,
at 113-17.
55. Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 122.
56. P. Spiewak, The Battle for a Constitution, 6 EECR Nos. 2-3, 89, 96 (1997).
57. See Malajny, supra note 3.
58. POL. CONST. (1997) pmbl., 12, 13, 16.
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Moreover, in Chapter I of the Constitution, entitled "The
Republic" (Rzeczpospolita), which expounds the principles on
which the Polish state is to be based, there are two further gen-
eral provisions of relevance to human rights. A very important
clause is Article 2, which states, "The Republic of Poland is a
democratic state governed by law implementing the principles of
social justice." This simple but nonetheless powerful statement
encompasses in essence the raison ditre for including human
rights in the constitution of a democratic state, namely to pro-
tect individuals against the excesses of government by ensuring
that the actions of the latter are in accordance with the law and
the pursuit of social justice, which can be identified with the
whole panoply of human rights guarantees, but particularly eco-
nomic and social rights. 59 It should be noted that an identical
provision was inserted into Article 1 of the 1952 Polish Constitu-
tion by constitutional amendment in 1989, modeled on the so-
called Rechtsstaat principle in the German Constitution.6 ° The
Constitutional Tribunal has already had the opportunity to inter-
pret this principle widely by developing unwritten due process
standards. It has upheld the prohibition against retroactive laws,
the protection of vested rights, the principle of access to justice
through independent courts, and the right to a procedurally fair
judicial hearing. 61 More recently, as discussed below in Part III,
Section C, Subsection 1, on the Right to Life, the Tribunal relied
on this principle in ruling that abortion legislation permitting
the termination of a pregnancy for social reasons was unconstitu-
59. The concept of social justice was defined by the Rapporteur of the Constitu-
tional Commission of the National Assembly, Sejm Deputy Marek Mazurkiewicz (SLD),
as the obligation of state authorities to adopt a limited form of social interventionism,
with the aim of equalizing the opportunities of citizens with respect to their lives and
social aspirations. Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2.
60. See Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 35, at 35-36 (defining Rechtsstaat (or "state
ruled by law") principle, as principle "rooted in nineteenth-century German legal cul-
ture, [and principle that] maintains that positive law should be consistent with funda-
mental rules ofjustice, fairness, and equity. In its interaction with individuals, the State
thus has an overarching obligation to abide by certain unwritten rules of justice.").
61. Id. at 36-42. This jurisprudence has continued with the adoption of the new
Polish Constitution. For example, Judgments K22/96 of 17 Dec. 1997 and U11/97 of
27 Nov. 1997, in which the Constitutional Tribunal, upholding applications by the
Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, ruled, inter alia, that laws with retroactive force
breached Article 2 of the new Polish Constitution. Polish summaries of these recent
judgments are available from the Tribunal's home page on the internet: <http://
www.trybunal.gov.pl/>.
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tional.62
The commitment of the Constitution to supporting a broad
range of human rights is exemplified by the reference to the
principles of social justice in Article 2 and reiterated in Article 5,
which states that "[t] he Republic of Poland safeguards the inde-
pendence and integrity of its territory and safeguards the free-
doms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citi-
zens, safeguards the national heritage and ensures the protec-
tion of the natural environment based on the principles of
balanced development."
63
B. General Principles
1. The Natural and Inalienable Dignity of the Human Being
Chapter II, Articles 30 through 37, begins with an enuncia-
tion of general principles. Article 30 is concerned with the
source of rights and freedoms and declares that "[t]he natural
and inalienable dignity of the human being constitutes the
source of the freedoms and rights of man and citizen. It is invio-
lable and its respect and protection is the obligation of public
authorities. '64 That human rights are derived from the dignity
of the human being has been described as a very powerful con-
cept, i.e., "a source of human rights conceived in such a way
puts them above the state power which should only recognize
and protect, but has no creative competencies in this field. '6
Similarly, Article 31(2) places everyone under an obligation "to
respect the freedoms and rights of others," but no one can be
"compelled to do that which is not required by law." 66 The past
assumption in the socialist concept of rights that freedom was
62. In response to criticism that the Rechtsstaat principle has been relied on too
frequently by the Constitutional Tribunal, with the result that some judgments have
acquired a "political character" and have thus infringed upon the competence of Parlia-
ment, Prof. Andrzej Zoll, the former President of the Tribunal, contends that the Tri-
bunal has been forced to resort to this principle because it was the only norm that
conformed to the new legal order. With the entry into force of the new Polish Constitu-
tion, however, the Tribunal will be able to benefit from new principles. See Andrej Zoll,
Ostatni moment na poprawienie ustawy [ The Last Chance to Amend the Statute], RZECZPOS-
POLITA, July 28, 1997; Symposium: Constitutional 'Revolution' in the Ex-Communist World:
The Rule of Law, September 26, 1996, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'v 45, 93 (1997) [herein-
after Constitutional Symposium].
63. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 2.
64. Id. art. 30.
65. Michalska & Sandorski, supra note 49, at 118 (footnote omitted).
66. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 31(2).
1998]
254 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:236
granted by the state and, consequently, that "everything which
was not permitted by law was prohibited" is therefore reversed.67
2. Equality
Articles 32 and 33 of the Constitution are concerned with
the principle of equality. The former provision asserts in its first
paragraph that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law. All per-
sons have the right to equal treatment by public authorities.
6
Clearly, the second sentence circumscribes the equality principle
to treatment by public bodies with the result that horizontal
equality in the private sphere is not constitutionally protected.69
There appears, however, to be no such distinction in the
latter provision, which applies the equality principle to men and
women. 70 Moreover, the prohibited areas and grounds of dis-
crimination are not specified, which suggests, in theory, that a
broad approach to outlawing discrimination is possible. Article
32 (2) does not enumerate a list of specific grounds, merely stat-
ing that discrimination is prohibited in "the political, social or
economic life on any grounds. '71 Article 33(1) reads broadly
that "men and women in the Republic of Poland have equal
rights in family, political, social and economic life." 72 This ap-
proach differs from the position in the previous constitutional
67. See Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 123 (referring to draft Charter of Rights).
68. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 32.
69. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the draft Charter was also to apply only on
the vertical plane. See Rzeplinski, supra note 54, at 28; Halmai, supra note 4, at 154.
Note, however, an earlier Sejm draft provision proclaimed explicitly that: "Constitu-
tional rights and freedoms apply to the relationships between private parties according
to their nature." See Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 128 n.72 (observing that this provision
was also included in 1993 draft submitted by PSL (art. 17)).
70. However, the principle of equality between men and women does not find
expression in the terminology of the Constitution, which persists in using non-inclusive
language. Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comments of Sejm
DeputyJidwiga Bloch (SLD)). Moreover, a suggestion to include formal constitutional
mechanisms, in the form of a Commissioner and Commission on Equal Status, the
function of which would be to combat discrimination against citizens on the ground of
gender, was not taken up. See id. (comments by Sen. ZdzislawaJanowska (KSN)).
71. The drafting process reveals that the Constitutional Commission decided to
avoid drawing up a list of prohibited grounds of discrimination when it withdrew a
proposal to include specifically a provision on sexual orientation after protests from the
Catholic Church and a number of conservative parties. See Constitution Watch: Poland, 5
EECR No. 4, 17, 18 (1996); Osiatynski, supra note 2, at 71.
72. A non-exhaustive definition of this principle, however, is found in the follow-
ing paragraph: "Men and women have equal rights, in particular, with respect to educa-
tion, employment and promotions and have the right to equal compensation for work
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provision on equality, which listed the prohibited grounds,73 but
seems to be in keeping with the jurisprudence of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal holding that this list was not exhaustive.74 More-
over, the Tribunal has already developed a broad conception of
equality, which goes beyond the mere equal application of the
laws.75 It is therefore likely that the new expansive provisions on
equality will enable it to develop its reasoning under the new
Polish Constitution in a similar fashion.
3. The Protection of Minorities, Aliens, and Citizenship
The remainder of the section on General Principles in
Chapter II is concerned with membership in the Polish state, in-
cluding the nature of citizenship,76 the rights of Polish citizens
belonging to national or ethnic minorities,77 and the rights of
of equal value, to social security, to hold offices, and to receive public honors and deco-
rations." POL. CONST. (1997) art. 33(2).
73. Id. art. 67(2). "Citizens of the Polish People's Republic shall have equal rights
irrespective of sex, birth, education, trade or profession, nationality, race, religion, so-
cial origin and status." Id.
74. Judgment K1/91 of 28 May 1991, ORZECZNicrwo TRYBUNALU KONSIYru-
CVJNECO [DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 81 (1991) (holding that equality
principle should be applied to "all situations where we address the rights of individuals
belonging to the same category"); see Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 35, at 43.
75. Constitutional Symposium, supra note 62, at 93; Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note
35, at 44, (citingJudgment K6/89 of 24 October 1989, ORZECZNICTWO TRYBUNALU KON-
STYrUCYJNEGO [DEcISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 100 (1991) (finding in fa-
vour of women miners by declaring laws that permitted both men and women miners to
retire with full pension after 25 years of employment unconstitutional)). The Tribunal
held that women should be able to retire at an earlier age because of the physical and
biological differences between the sexes.
76. Article 34 of the new Polish Constitution concerns the acquisition and loss of
citizenship. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 34. Article 34(1) proclaims that the jus sanguini
principle of citizenship acquisition is to apply in Poland-by birth to parents who are
Polish citizens-with the proviso that other methods of acquiring citizenship are speci-
fied by law. Article 34(2) asserts that Polish nationality can only be lost by renunciation.
Article 36 confers upon Polish citizens abroad the right to protection by the Polish
State. Id. art. 36
77. Id. (1997) art. 35. This provision appears to contain a concept of "group
rights." Article 35(1) is phrased in terms of individual rights by obliging the state to
ensure "to Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to
maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions and to
develop their own culture." Consequently, it mirrors to some extent the wording in
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. On the other hand, Article
35(2) grants the right to "national and ethnic minorities .. . to establish educational
and cultural institutions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to
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aliens within Poland's jurisdiction, who are to enjoy the same
rights and freedoms as those guaranteed by the Constitution to
citizens unless otherwise specified by law.78 Aliens are to benefit
from most civil and political rights enjoyed by citizens, with the
exception of the traditional political rights such as the right of
access to the public service and the right to vote. 79 They may
also benefit from most economic and social rights, although it is
rather disconcerting that the right to social security is restricted
to Polish citizens.8° Moreover, the full enjoyment of rights to
health, education, and housing is also limited to Polish citi-
zens."1 Such an approach is clearly at odds with the universality
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR"), which grants these rights to everyone.82
participate in the solution of matters connected with their cultural identity." POL.
CONST. (1997) art. 35(2). There is, however, no explicit constitutional entitlement to
state assistance for minority activities. An inherent limitation on such activities is also
contained in the section on duties in Article 82, which declares that "[I]oyalty to the
Republic of Poland, as well as concern for the common good, are the duty of every
Polish citizen." Id. art. 82. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the introduction of the
preambular phrase, "We, the Polish Nation-all citizens of the Republic," gave rise to
objections from Henryk Kroll, the Sejm representative of the German minority. Third
Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
78. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 37. Presumably, the reasons for restricting the rights
and freedoms of aliens would have to conform to those set out in Article 31 (3) con-
cerned with limitations. See Part III.F (Limitations on Rights).
79. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 60, 62. The right to obtain information on the activi-
ties of public authorities and public officials is also restricted to citizens. Id. art. 61.
80. Id. art. 67. Indeed, this approach mirrors the one taken under the amended
Hungarian Constitution, where social security rights are also restricted to citizens. A
MAGYOR KOZTARSARAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution] art, 70E(1) (Hung.). The Czecho-
Slovak Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which retains constitutional
standing in both countries, restricts a broader range of economic and social rights to
citizens, such as social security, free medical care, and free elementary and secondary
education. JsTAVNI ZAKON CESKt REPUBLIKY [Constitution] arts. 30(1), 31, 33(2)
(Czech Rep.). Osiatynski notes the concerns of Dona Gomien with respect to those
Polish constitutional drafts that discriminated explicitly between citizens and aliens in
the area of social rights. Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 126-27 n.66 (citing Dona Gomien,
General Report of the Conference, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 192 (A.
Rzeplinski ed., 1992)).
81. Although both Articles 68 and 70 grant the right of "everyone" to the protec-
tion of health and education, "equal access to health care services, financed from pub-
lic funds," POL. CONST. (1997) art. 68(2), and "universal and equal access to education"
is to be ensured by public authorities to citizens only. Id. art. 70(4). Similarly, under
Article 75(1), public authorities are under an obligation to "pursue policies conducive
to satisfying the housing needs of citizens." Id. art. 75(1) (emphasis added).
82. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1996, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR]. For example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
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4. The Place of International Law
A very important source of rights and freedoms is interna-
tional law as manifested in the various international human
rights instruments ratified by Poland.13 The place that interna-
tional law, including international human rights standards,
should occupy in the Constitution generated considerable aca-
demic debate during drafting.8 4 The relation of international
law to domestic law under the socialist 1952 Polish Constitution
was hardly clear. In legal theory, the prevalent view was that in-
ternational treaties were binding and enforceable within the do-
mestic legal order, ex proprio vigore,85 although the courts applied
this doctrine rarely in practice, and in one important decision
the Polish Supreme Court ignored it by emphasizing that inter-
national agreements could only have binding effect within the
country if they were incorporated into domestic law.8 6 More-
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") reads: "The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance." Id. art. 9,
993 U.N.T.S. at 7, 6 I.L.M. at 362-63 (emphasis added).
83. See generally Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 161 (citing numerous international
human rights instruments).
84. See, e.g., Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Przyszla konstytucja RP a miejsce prawa
miedzynarodowego w krajowym porzadku prawnym [A Future Constitution of the Republic of Po-
land and the Position of International Law in the Municipal Legal Order], 49 PANSTwO I
PRAwo No. 3, at 11 (1994); Anna Wyrozumska, Zapewnianie skutecznosci prawu
miedzynarodowemu w prawie krajourym w projekcie konstytucji RP [Making International Law
Effective Under a Draft Constitution of the Republic of Poland], 51 PANsTwo I PRAwo No. 11,
at 16 (1996); Zdzislaw. Kedzia, The Place of Human Rights Treaties in the Polish Legal Order,
2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 133 (1991); Michalska & Sandorski, supra note 49, at 103-16.
85. Kazimierz Dzialocha, The Hierarchy of Constitutional Norms and its Function in the
Protection of Human Rights (Polish Report to the 8th Conference of European Constitu-
tional Courts, Ankara, 7-10 May 1990), 13 H.R.L.J. 100, 110 (1992); Kedzia, supra note
84, at 133-34. Kedzia also observes that this doctrine was applicable under the inter-war
constitutions of 1922 and 1935. Kedzia, supra, at 136.
86. Kedzia, supra note 84, at 134-35 nn.6-7, (citing Case I PRZ 8/87, Decision of
the Supreme Court of 25 Aug. 1987, published in ORZECZNICTWO SADU NAJWYZSZEGO [DE-
CISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT] 12/1987 (Pol.)). This case concerned the refusal of
district courts to register the trade union "Solidarity," which had been banned after the
imposition of martial law. Id. The union relied on Article 22 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which safeguards "the right to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions." See ICCPR,
supra note 77, art. 22, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178, 6 I.L.M. at 374. Along with the ICCPR, the
union relied on the ILO Convention, and both the ICCPR and the ILO Convention
were ratified by Poland.. See ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17. The Polish Supreme
Court adopted a radical conception of the dualist approach to international law and
ruled that because these instruments, though ratified, had not been incorporated into
Polish law, they only bound Poland externally. Id. The Court based its opinion on
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over, international law was not afforded priority over domestic
law unless expressly specified in the statute.8 7
Although the section on general principles in Chapter II
does not make any reference to international law, Article 9, in
Chapter I on the "Republic," proclaims that "[t]he Republic of
Poland respects international law binding upon it."88 The place
of international law in the Constitution is described in Chapter
III entitled "Sources of Law."89 Article 87 recognizes that ratified
international agreements constitute one of the sources of "uni-
versally binding law" of Poland, together with the Constitution,
statutes, and regulations. ° This formulation is open to criticism
because it only refers to one aspect of international law ignoring
customary international law, and decisions of international orga-
nizations.9" In this regard, it is pertinent to note that a presiden-
tial amendment to ensure that rights and freedoms in the draft
constitution conformed to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("UDHR") was rejected by the Polish National Assem-
bly.92 Therefore, if the UDHR is regarded as having acquired
the status of customary international law,9" it can only be con-
cluded that the UDHR cannot amount to a source of "universally
binding law" of Poland.
The Constitution stipulates that international treaties are
Article 61 of the socialist Constitution, which stated: "Judges are independent and
subordinated only to parliamentary statutes." See R. Kwiecien, Transformacija umdw
miedzynarodowychjakoforma stanowienia prawa w panstwie (z uwzglednieniem praktyki polskie])
[The Incorporation of International Agreements as a Form of Law-Making in the State (with
Reference to Polish Practice)], 52 PANSTWO I PRAwo No. 4, at 3, 11-13.
87. Dzialocha, supra note 85, at 110.
88. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 9.
89. Id. ch. III.
90. Id. art. 87.
91. See Wyrozumska, supra note 84, at 33-34 (referring to project of draft Constitu-
tion dated June 19, 1996); see also Michalska & Sandorski, supra note 49, at 107 (refer-
ring to exclusion of customary norms of international law as source of Polish system of
law in Sejm's draft constitution drawn in 1991).
92. Fourth Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2; see Constitution Watch:
Poland, 6 EECR No. 1, 20, 22 (1997). Indeed, the 1992 draft Charter of Rights con-
tained a comparable clause to the proposed amendment, requiring the rights and free-
doms in the Charter "to be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the international agreements on rights and freedoms ratified by the
Republic of Poland." See Michalska & Sandorski, supra note 49, at 129; Halmai, supra
note 4, at 156.
93. See MVREs S. McDouGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HUMAN DIGNITY 273-74, 325-27
(1980).
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ratified by the President,94 but the ratification of an interna-
tional agreement concerning, inter alia, "freedoms, rights or ob-
ligations of citizens, as specified in the Constitution" must also
be approved in the form of a statute passed by a two-thirds ma-
jority in both the Sejm and the Senate.95 Once approved in this
way, Article 91 (1) provides that the agreement becomes part of
the domestic legal order and is to apply directly, in other words,
is self-executing, "unless its application depends on the enact-
ment of law."96 The subsequent provision, Article 91(2), makes
it clear that ratified international agreements are to prevail over
statutory law: "An international agreement ratified upon prior
consent granted by law shall have precedence over statutes if
such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of
such statutes. '97 This is a significant development in contrast to
the previous position explained earlier.
The Constitution, however, is silent on the status of ratified
international agreements vis-d-vis the highest law itself and it
must therefore be assumed that constitutional provisions will
take precedence.98 Such an interpretation is buttressed further
by the expanded mandate of the Constitutional Tribunal, con-
sidered in Part III, Section G, Subsection 3, which adjudicates on
the conformity of international agreements to the Constitu-
tion.9 In practice, however, such adjudication is only likely to
occur before agreements are ratified"' or before their ratifica-
tion is approved by the Sejm.1 ' In one respect, therefore, this
power may operate to further human rights because if the Tribu-
nal finds that the international agreement safeguards human
94. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 133(1), 1.
95. Id. arts. 89, 90(2).
96. Id. art. 91.
97. Id. art. 91(2).
98. This interpretation would conform to the position adopted by most of the
draft constitutions submitted in 1993, providing that international law would be
subordinate to the constitution but superior to legislation. See Osiatynski, supra note
29, at 164. It also appears to satisfy the view of Polish international lawyers that interna-
tional treaties should be put between the constitution and parliamentary statutes. See
Kedzia, supra note 84, at 139.
99. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 188, 1.
100. Before ratifying an international agreement, the President can refer it to the
Constitutional Tribunal. Id. art. 133(2).
101. See Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Prawo miedzynarodowe a prawo wewnetrzne w projekcie
konstytucji RP (Uwagi na tle artykulu Anny Wyrozumskiej) [International Law and Domestic
Law in the Draft Constitution (Comments in the light of the article by Anna Wyrozumska)], 52
PANsiwo 1 PRAwo No. 2, at 99, 101 (1997).
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rights more effectively than the Constitution, then a constitu-
tional amendment might follow. Although the drafters clearly in-
tended Chapter II of the Constitution to be compatible with in-
ternational human rights standards, 11 2 it must nonetheless be
concluded that the subordination of international norms to the
Constitution weakens, in theory at least, the protection of
human rights in Poland in those instances where already ratified
international human rights instruments might provide stronger
guarantees. 0 3
Given the supremacy of constitutional norms over interna-
tional law, it is perhaps somewhat surprising to find an unambig-
uous provision such as Article 90(1), which states that "It]he
Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements,
delegate to an international organization or international insti-
tution the competence of organs of State in some matters."10' 4
Clearly, the purpose of this clause is to prepare for Poland's fu-
ture accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") and the European Union. Consent for ratification of
such an international agreement is subject to stringent safe-
guards requiring either the passing of a statute with the support
of a two-thirds majority in both the Sejm and the Senate in the
presence of at least half of the Deputies and Senators respec-
tively, or the approval of the people in a nationwide referendum,
which is only binding if more than half of the eligible voters par-
ticipate.10 5 In spite of these safeguards, the generality of this
provision has been criticized by some as constituting a threat to
Poland's sovereignty and independence, particularly in the light
of the country's tragic past. 0 6
102. See Osiatynski, supra note 2, at 73. Osiatynski also notes that some rights, such
as those concerned with information, go beyond the scope of international standards.
Id.; see Part III.C.2 (Right to Information).
103. In practice, however, the Constitutional Tribunal is likely to continue to re-
sort to international norms to assist it in the interpretation of the human rights guaran-
tees in the new Polish Constitution. As observed by Professor Zoll, after 1989 the Tribu-
nal managed to employ international legal norms in its jurisprudence by relying on the
Rechtsstaat clause (incorporated into the new Polish Constitution in Article 2 discussed
above), which enabled the Tribunal to argue in certain cases that "international norms
constitute the basis of any rule-of-law system." See Irena Grudzinska-Gross, Interview with
Professor Andrzej Zoll, Chief Justice of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 6 EECR No. 1, 77
(1997).
104. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 90(1).
105. Id. arts. 90(2)-(3), 125(3).
106. See, e.g., Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comments by
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C. Civil and Political Rights
Civil and political rights, as understood in the context of
international human rights agreements, are widely protected
under the new Polish Constitution and are found in two sections
in Chapter II entitled "Personal Freedoms and Rights," Articles
38 through 56, and "Political Freedoms and Rights," Articles 57
through 63. Most of the rights and freedoms in these sections
are found in two international human rights treaties ratified by
Poland, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights10 7 ("ICCPR") and the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHR"). Some of these rights in the Constitution, however,
possess their specific Polish dimensions, while others are
broader in scope than the rights outlined in these international
instruments. The objective of this section is to highlight these
differences rather than to provide an overview of the whole
range of protected rights.
1. Right to Life
The right to life is proclaimed in Article 38, which states
that "[t] he Republic of Poland shall ensure the legal protection
of the life of every human being guarantees to everyone the legal
protection of life."1 °8 The draft Charter of Rights contained a
similar broadly-worded provision on the protection of the right
to life. The deliberately vague wording in Article 38 reflects a
compromise, 109 with the result that the responsibility for the reg-
ulation of abortion is passed effectively to the Sejm. 11° As writ-
ten, the provision would arguably seem to permit a restrictive law
on abortion as well as a liberal law. In this regard, it should be
noted that proposals to protect human life explicitly from the
Sen. Piotr Andrzejewski (NSZZ 'Solidarnosc') and Sejm Deputy, Janusz Dobrosz
(PSL)).
107. Poland ratified the ICCPR on March 18, 1977, but it only accepted the right
of individual petition under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967), when it
acceded to the Protocol on November 7, 1991. See <http://www.unhchr.ch/> (internet
site of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights).
108. POL. CONST. (1997) art 38.
109. Constitution Watch: Poland, 4 EECR No. 2, 21 (1995).
110. As noted by Rzeplinski, the intention of the draft Charter was to leave "con-
troversial questions," such as the regulation of the right to life, "for future constitu-
tional practice to settle." Rzeplinski, supra note 54, at 28; see Malajny, supra note 3.
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moment of conception were not accepted.111
The Constitutional Tribunal's restrictive view of abortion,
culminating in its recent decision in May 1997, however, appears
to have considerably limited the Sejm's competence to legislate
in this area. In January 1991, the Tribunal upheld a Ministry of
Health regulation permitting doctors to refuse or to assist in car-
rying out abortions as being in conformity with the freedom of
conscience clause of the amended 1952 Polish Constitution.1 12
In October 1992, the Tribunal dismissed on procedural grounds
a petition of the Ombudsman challenging the amended Medical
Code of Ethics ("Code"), adopted by the Polish Congress of the
National Medical Association, which restricted the performance
of abortions by doctors to cases of rape or threat to a women's
life or health."' In March 1993, however, the Tribunal did re-
view the Code and found it to be superseded by the less stringent
but nonetheless fairly restrictive Abortion Act of 1993, passed in
January 1993, which effectively prohibited "abortion on de-
mand."'1 4 In June 1994, the newly composed Sejm and Senate,
controlled by the left-wing SLD-PSL coalition, passed an amend-
ment to the Polish Penal Code, liberalizing abortion rights con-
siderably. This amendment was vetoed by President Walesa,
111. See Article 17(1) in the project on the Constitution drafted by the Solidarity-
dominated Senate of 1990, which is referred to in an overview of the early drafts by
Zdzislaw Czeszejko-Sochacki, Projekty nowej konstytucji (Przeglad zagadnien wezlowych) [Bills
of the New Constitution (A Review of Basic Problems)], 46 PANsTWo I PRAwo No. 7, at 6
(1991); see Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 129 (refering to Article 9(1) of 'Solidarity'
draft).
112. Judgment U 8/90 of 15 Jan. 1991, ORZECZNIcrwO TRYBUNALU KONSTYTU-
CYJNEGO [DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 134 (1991), cited by Brzezinski &
Garlicki, supra note 35, at 51.
113. Judgment U 1/92 of 7 Oct. 1992, ORZECZNIcrwo TRYBUNALU KONSTYTU-
CYJNEGO [DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 157 (1992(11)), cited by Brzezin-
ski & Garlicki, supra note 35, at 51-52.
114. Judgment W 16/82 of 17 Mar. 1993, ORZECZNIcrwo TRYBUNALU KONST'ru-
CYJNEGO [DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 156 (1993), cited by Brzezinski &
Garlicki, supra note 35, at 52-53. The Abortion Act declared the right to life of every
human being from the moment of conception and only permitted abortions in cases
when the women's health is in danger, when the fetus is severely deformed, or when the
pregnancy results from rape or incest. Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra, at 52 (citing Ustawa
z dnia 7 stycznia 1993 o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie plodu ludzkiego i warunkach
dopuszczalnosci pzerywania ciazy [Law of 7 January 1993 on Family Planning, Protec-
tion of the Human Foetus, and Conditions Under Which Abortion Is Allowed], DZIEN-
NIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 17, Item 78 (1993)). In short, the legislation prohib-
ited "abortion on demand" because it only allowed abortion for medical reasons and
not "for important social reasons." See Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 129 n.77.
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however, who opposed abortion, and the Sejm failed to obtain
the necessary two-thirds majority in order to override the veto. n5
With the presidential election of Aleksander Kwasniewski,
another amendment, permitting abortion in difficult financial
and personal circumstances in the first trimester of pregnancy,
was introduced into Polish Parliament in 1996.116 Although it
passed through the Sejm twice, overriding the Senate's rejection
of the amendment, and was signed by the President, the new
legislation was challenged before the Constitutional Tribunal by
a group of "Solidarity" Senators in December 1996. On May 27,
1997, the Tribunal ruled that the law was unconstitutional. The
Tribunal's principal argument was that the concept of the demo-
cratic state ruled by law, as articulated in Article 1 of the
amended 1952 Polish Constitution, presently Article 2 of the
new Constitution, held human beings and their most valuable
goods, to be the supreme value. According to the Tribunal, life
was such a good that it had to be afforded constitutional protec-
tion in all stages of its development in a democratic state. While
the Tribunal accepted that constitutional goods can conflict and
that one good can be limited by another, it considered that the
protection of a pregnant woman's right to shape her life condi-
tions freely and to satisfy her material needs and those of her
family could not be implemented so far as to interfere with a
fundamental good such as human life. 117 Because the law on
abortion pre-dated the new Polish Constitution, the judgment of
the Tribunal was not final and was subject to consideration by
the Sejm, which was within its power to overturn the ruling by a
115. Constitution Watch: Poland, 2-3 EECR Nos. 3-4, 15, 16 (1994).
116. Ustawa z 30 sierpnia 1996 o zmianie ustawy o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie
plodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalnosci przerywania ciazy oraz o zmianie niek-
t6rych innych ustaw [Law of 30 August 1996 Amending the Law on Family Planning,
Protection of the Human Foetus, and Conditions Under Which Abortion Is Allowed, as
well as Amending Other Laws], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 139, Item 646
(1996), art. 4a(2). For a detailed discussion of this amendment as well as its predeces-
sor, see John Majewski, Karalnosc aborcji w PoIsce w swietle ostatnich zmian legislacyjnych
[The Punishment of Abortion in Poland in the Light of Recent Legislative Changes], 52
PANsstwo i PRAwo No. 4, at 65 (1994).
117. Judgment K26/96 of 27 May 1997 <http://www.Rzeczpospolita.pl/pub/
polka-aborcja.html> (on file with the Fardham International Law Journal) (containing
full Polish text of judgment). Three judges issued dissenting opinions: Zdzislaw Czes-
zejko-Sochacki, Lech Garlicki, and Wojciech Sokolewicz. For a brief overview of the
decision, see Constitution Watch: Poland, 6 EECR Nos. 2-3, 25, 28 (1997).
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two-thirds majority vote.118 The election of the rightist AWS in
September 1997, however, ensured that there was a majority in
the Sejm supporting further restrictions on abortion, and the
ruling of the Tribunal was approved on December 17, 1997.119
2. Right to Information
Articles 51 and 61 of the Constitution contain fairly exten-
sive provisions dealing with the right to information 120 and guar-
antee, according to Prof. Marek Nowicki, that there will be no
rebirth of totalitarianism in Poland. 21  Article 51 ensures that
"[n]o one can be obliged, except on the basis of statute, to dis-
close information concerning his person," prohibits public au-
thorities from collecting or making accessible information on
citizens "other than that which is necessary," and provides the
individual with the right to access any information collected.1 22
These clauses confirm that the authorities cannot interfere too
intrusively in people's lives. This is the essence of totalitarian
power, which interferes in the whole of every individual's life. 121
Article 61, placed in the section on "Political Freedoms and
Rights," proclaims the right of the citizen "to obtain information
on the activities of organs of public authority as well as persons
discharging public functions.' '1 24
3. Religious Freedom
Article 53 is concerned with religious freedom. Because of
the historically important and influential position of the Roman
Catholic Church in Poland, this provision is rather different
than those usually shorter statements of principle found in inter-
118. For more information, see Part III.G.2.
119. See Aborcja zakazana [Abortion Prohibited], RZECZPOSPOLiTA, Dec. 18, 1997. The
Sejm approved the Tribunal's decision by a vote of 231 to 160 with 11 abstentions. Id.
120. The right to information first found its expression in Article 10 of the draft
Charter of Rights submitted to Parliament by President Walesa in November 1992. See
Rzeplinski, supra note 54, at 28.
121. Nowicki, supra note 3.
122. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 51(1)-(3).
123. Nowicki, supra note 3.
124. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 61(1). Note the specific limitations clause in Article
61 (3), however, which states that limitations on this right "can be imposed by law solely
to protect freedoms and rights of other persons and economic subjects, public order,
security or important economic interests of the State." Id. art. 61(3).
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national human rights instruments. 125 This does not mean, how-
ever, that there is no separation of church and state under the
new Polish Constitution nor that the Roman Catholic faith is
necessarily accorded constitutional supremacy over other reli-
gions and beliefs in Poland. 126 Rather, the relationship between
the state and churches, and other religious organizations is
"based on the principle of respect for their autonomy and the
mutual independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the
principle of cooperation for the individual and the common
good."1 2 7 This spirit of compromise is also reflected in the Pre-
125. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
126. It is noteworthy that two draft projects on the Constitution proposed legiti-
mating the supremacy of the Roman Catholic faith. See Mariusz Gulczynski, Zasady us-
trojowe w projektach konstytucji RP [Social, Political and Economic Foundations of the Polish
Constitutional Bills], 49 PANSTWO I PRAwo No. 4, at 13 (1994) (referring to projects sub-
mitted by PC and KPN). Professor Gulczynski notes, however, that the latter proposal
also contained a statement that membership of a specific church or religious organiza-
tion did not grant persons any additional rights to those possessed by persons who are
members of another religious organization or who do not belong to any religious
group. Id.
127. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 25(3). Article 25(3) is found in the first section of
the Constitution entitled, "The Republic." The avoidance of a direct reference to "sep-
aration" was a far-reaching concession to the Roman Catholic Church. See Constitution
Watch: Poland, 4 EECR No. 2, 18, 21 (1995). This provision appears also to be broadly
in agreement with the position of the Polish Roman Catholic bishops, who stressed the
principles of autonomy as well as the co-operation of church and state for the good of
the human person. See KH. Jablonski, Problematyka wyznaniowo-swiatopogladowa w
projektach konstytucji RP [Ideological and Religious Issues in Drafts of the Polish Constitution],
47 PANSTwo PiRAwo No. 2, at 75, 77 (1992). However, during the Third Session of the
National Assembly, Sejm Deputy Izabella Sierakowska (SLD) argued that autonomy
should not have the same meaning as sovereignty, implying that otherwise the State
would be limiting its own sovereignty by entering into relations with other churches and
religious organizations. Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2. The
Constitutional Commission then proposed to delete the reference to the autonomy
principle, an amendment rejected by a later gathering of the National Assembly. 3-cie
Posiedzienie Zgromadzenia Narodowego, 21-22 marca 1997 r., Nr 161 (284) II kadencja
[Third Session of the National Assembly, 21-22 March 1997, No. 161 (284), 2nd Term];
see POL. CONST. (1994) art. 25(4) (stating that "[t]he relations between the Republic of
Poland and the Roman Catholic Church are determined by international treaty [other-
wise know as 'the Concordat'] concluded with the Holy See, and by law"). The exist-
ence of this provision led some politicians to argue that the Constitution clearly favors
the Catholic Church at the expense of other churches and religious organizations. See,
e.g., Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (including comments by Sejm
Deputies Jan Zaborowski (PKND) and Izabella Sierakowska (SLD)). The Concordat,
signed by the Government of Hanna Suchocka, the present Minister of Justice, and the
Holy See on July 28, 1993, was finally approved by the Sejm on January 8, 1998, by a
vote of 273 to 161, with 2 abstentions, and by the Senate on January 22, 1998. It was
signed by the President three days later. The Concordat was ratified on February 23,
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amble of the Constitution, which mentions God but also protects
the rights of non-believers. The following provision was crafted
by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first Prime Minister of post-commu-
nist Poland and a member of UW: 128
We, the Polish Nation-all citizens of the Republic,
Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice,
good and beauty,
As well as those who do not share such faith but respect those
universal values arising from other sources ....
[E]stablish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland.1 29
This issue threatened to torpedo the whole constitutional pro-
ject because this allusion to God, or invocatio Dei, was opposed by
left-wing groups and criticized by those who wanted a more
forceful reference to God in the Constitution.13 0
Article 53 contains a somewhat lengthy, though not exhaus-
tive, definition of religious freedom.' In an obvious concession
1998, and came into force one month after the exchange of ratification documents,
which took place at the Vatican on March 25, 1998. See RZECZPOSPOLITA, Jan. 9, 1998,
Jan. 23, 1998, Jan. 26, 1998, Feb. 14, 1998, Feb. 24, 1998, Mar. 26, 1998.
A unilateral declaration explaining the previous Government's understanding of
the interpretation of some of the Concordat's provisions had already been adopted on
April 15, 1997. The declaration provides a fuller definition of the principle of auton-
omy referred to in Article 25(3) of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Concordat: "It
is a conferment of legal status to a practice which has developed in Poland over the last
several years. It implies the rejection of an interpretation of constitutional norms ex-
pressing an antagonistic relationship in favour of interpretation presuming co-opera-
tion for the human development and the common good." Constitution Watch: Po-
land, 6 EECR Nos. 2-3, 25, 27 (1997) (quoting paragraph one of declaration). The
Polish texts of the Concordat and Declaration are reproduced in RZECZPOSPOLITA, Apr.
16, 1997.
128. See Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comments by Sejm
Deputy Tadeusz Mazowiecki); Constitution Watch: Poland, 6 EECR No. 1, 20, 21 (1997).
129. POL. CONST. (1997) pmbl., 11 3-5, 15.
130. This group was of the view that the Constitution should have reflected Po-
land's Christian, and moral, roots more concretely and that God had been invoked in a
tentative and forced way. See Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2
(comments by Sen. Barbara Lekawa and Sen. Jadwiga Stokarska (NSZZ 'Solidarnosc')).
The reference to God has also been referred to as a "decoration." See Spiewak, supra
note 56, at 92, (citing Cardinal Henryk Gulbinowicz of the Polish Episcopate). Indeed,
the apparent compromise between the drafters and the church on the Constitution
waned considerably in the weeks leading up to the referendum when, during the Con-
ference of the Episcopate of Poland (April 30 to May 2, 1997), a statement was issued
expressing "serious moral reservations" about the text of the Constitution. See Constitu-
tion Watch: Poland, 6 EECR Nos. 2-3, 25, 26 (1997).
131. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 53(2). Article 53(2) states:
Freedom of religion shall include the freedom to profess or to accept a reli-
gion by personal choice as well as to manifest such religion individually or
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to the Roman Catholic Church, the provision asserts, in Article
53(4), that "[t]he religion of a church or other legally recog-
nized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other
peoples' freedom of religion and conscience shall not be in-
fringed thereby. ' 132 This proviso is effectively reiterated in two
further provisions prohibiting compulsion "to participate or not
to participate in religious practices" and compulsion of the indi-
vidual by organs of public authority "to disclose his philosophy
of life, religious convictions or belief."13 3 The tenet of these pro-
visions conforms to a Constitutional Tribunal judgment in 1991.
This decision upheld a Ministry of Education regulation, which
directed public schools to permit the Catholic Church and other
churches to offer religion classes in schools and required parents
to declare their interest to school authorities when registering
their children in such classes. The Tribunal drew a distinction
between open positive declarations by citizens of their religious
preferences, which were permissible, and the requirement by
the State for such declarations, which were prohibited by the
freedom of conscience clause in the Constitution. 3 4
4. Right to Freedom of Expression
Article 54 is another response to the pre-1989 communist
period concerned with the right to freedom of expression. This
article explicitly prohibits in its second paragraph "[p]reventive
censorship of the means of social communication and the licens-
ing of the press.' 13 Constitutional standing is bestowed upon a
collectively, publicly or privately, by worshipping, praying, participating in cer-
emonies, performing of rites or teaching. Freedom of religion shall also in-
clude possession of sanctuaries and other places of worship for the satisfaction
of the needs of believers as well as the right of individuals, wherever they may
be, to benefit from religious services.
Id.
132. POL. CONST, (1997) art. 53(4).
133. Id. art. 53(6), (7).
134. Judgment K 11/90 of 30 Jan. 1990, ORZECZNlcrwo TRYBUNALU KONST-vT-
CYJNEGO [DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL] 27 (1991), cited by Brzezinski &
Garlicki, supra note 35, at 48-49. The relevant clause in the amended 1952 Polish Con-
stitution reads as follows: "The Republic of Poland shall guarantee freedom of con-
science and religion to its citizens .... No one may be compelled to participate in
religious activities or rites." POL. CONST. (1952) art. 82(1).
135. In its second sentence, however, Article 54(2) adds that "[s]tatutes may re-
quire the receipt of a permit for the operation of a radio or television station." PoL.
CONST. (1997) art. 54(2).
19981
268 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:236
specific institution with the task of protecting media expression.
In Chapter IX, entitled "Organs of State Control and for the De-
fense of Rights," the National Council of Radio Broadcasting
and Television, Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, is given the
mandate to "safeguard the freedom of speech, the right to infor-
mation as well as [to] safeguard the public interest regarding
radio broadcasting and television." '136 Members of the Council
are to be appointed by the Sejm, the Senate, and the Presi-
dent,13 7 and are to be politically independent.1 1 8 There is, how-
ever, no broader definition of freedom of expression in Article
54 beyond the following statement: "To everyone is guaranteed
the freedom to express opinions, to acquire and to disseminate
information." '39 This position is in contrast to the preceding
provision on religious freedom and the more detailed rendition
of the right to freedom of expression in Article 19(2) of the
ICCPR.
140
5. Right to Freedom of Association
The right to freedom of association is contained in Articles
58 and 59 in the section, "Political Freedoms and Rights." Not
surprisingly, its concept is drawn rather widely in recognition of
the important role this right has played in Poland in recent his-
tory, particularly in the context of the rise of the Solidarity trade
union from 1980 to 1981. Article 58 guarantees this right to eve-
ryone, while Article 59, in its first paragraph, ensures the right
specifically "in trades unions, socio-occupational organizations
of farmers, and in employers' organizations." '141 Article 59(3)
136. Id. art. 213(1). By virtue of Article 213(2), the Council is empowered to "is-
sue regulations and, in individual cases, [to] adopt resolutions." Id.
137. Id. art. 214(1). Objections to the involvement of the Sejm in the appoint-
ment process were raised during the latter stages of drafting. See, e.g., Third Session of
the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comments by Witold Grabos (SLD)).
138. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 214(2) (stating that "[a] member of the National
Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television shall not belong to a political party, a
trade union or perform public activities incompatible with the dignity of his function").
139. Id. art. 54(1); see id. art. 14 ("The Republic of Poland shall ensure the free-
dom of the press and other means of social communication.").
140. ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178, 6 I.L.M. at 374 (stating
that "[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.").
141. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 58, 59; see id. art. 12 (stating that "[t]he Republic of
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safeguards the right of trade unions "to organize workers' strikes
or other forms of protest subject to limitations specified by stat-
ute. ' 42 This provision also permits laws to limit or to forbid the
conduct of strikes by specified categories of workers or in spe-
cific fields "[f] or protection of the public interest. '143 Moreover,
Article 59(4) declares that "[t]he scope of freedom of associa-
tion in trade unions and employers' organizations may only be
subject to such statutory limitations as are permissible in accord-
ance with international agreements to which the Republic of Po-
land is a party. "144 A rather controversial provision is Article
58(2), which prohibits the establishment of "[a]ssociations
whose purposes or activities are contrary to the Constitution or
statutes."'45 Although it is the courts that ultimately decide
"whether to permit an association to register or to prohibit an
association from such activities," the rather vague and general
reference to "statutes" in this provision was criticized during the
latter stages of drafting as introducing too burdensome a limita-
tion on the right to association. 14 6
D. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
The question whether to include economic, social, and cul-
tural rights in the post-19 8 9 constitutions of Central and Eastern
European countries was the subject of an absorbing debate
among constitutional law scholars. 47 Economic, legal, and
Poland shall ensure freedom for the creation and functioning of trades unions, socio-
occupational organizations of farmers, societies, citizens' movements, other voluntary
associations and foundations").
142. A proposed amendment to extend the right to organize strikes to organiza-
tions other than trade unions was not accepted. This amendment was proposed by
Sejm Deputy Jan Rulewski (UW). Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2.
An explicit, though circumscribed, reference to the right to strike is found in Article
8(1) (c) of the ICESCR: "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to en-
sure: . . . (c) the right to strike provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws
of the particular country." ICESCR, supra note 82, art. 8(1)(c), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6, 6
I.L.M. at 362.
143. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 59(3).
144. Id. art. 59(4).
145. Id. art. 58(2).
146. Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comments by Sejm
Deputy Henryk Wujec (UW)).
147. See, for example, the exchange of views between Prof. Herman Schwartz, sup-
porting the inclusion of these rights, and Prof. Cass Sunstein, an advocate of the con-
trary position. Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution,
10 Am. U.J. I.L & POL. 1233 (1995); Herman Schwartz, In Defense of Aiming High: Why
1998]
270 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:236
moral arguments were raised against their inclusion.14 The
need to constitutionalize such entitlements, however, has been
put forcefully by Prof. Herman Schwartz:
What the nation believes to be indispensable to [its] general
welfare belongs in a constitution, whether these are negative
prohibitions on government conduct or positive entitlements
financed by the common treasury.... Social and economic
rights belong in the constitution because functionally a consti-
tution removes such indispensables from the vicissitudes of
majority rule. It imparts a degree of stability and near-perma-
nence to what it establishes. What should therefore go into a
constitution are those provisions that the founding genera-
tion deems so fundamental and irreplaceable that they
should be made very difficult to alter, unless there is a very
strong consensus for a change.1 49
Indeed, all the constitutions adopted in the region entrench
economic, social, and cultural rights to some degree. 5 ° In Po-
land, attachment to the concept that public authorities are
Economic and Social Rights Belong in the New Post-communist Constitutions of Europe, 1 EECR
No. 3, 25 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights
Don't Belong to the New Constitutions of Post-communist Europe, 2 EECR No. 1, 35 (1993);
Cass Sunstein, Something Old, Something New: Rights, Aspirations and State Action in Eastern
European Constitutions, 1 EECR No. 1, 18 (1992).
148. The economic argument relates to the existence of extremely limited finan-
cial resources in the region during the period of transition to market economies and
the need for state restraint. The legal argument emphasizes that these rights are essen-
tially unenforceable in the courts. Finally, the moral contention is based on the need to
overcome the propensity of people in Central and Eastern Europe to depend on state
provisions and to encourage individual initiative. See Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 139;
see also Schwartz, supra note 147, at 26-28; Sunstein, supra note 147, at 36-37.
149. Schwartz, supra note 147, at 25-26 (emphasis original). Moreover, it is argued
that economic and social rights cannot be excluded from a modern constitution re-
gardless of the economic system adopted by the government concerned:
"[C]onstitutionalization of socio-economic rights is inevitable, independently of the
ideology professed, either social democratic or capitalist. A civilized state at the end of
the twentieth century can only be a welfare state, i.e., a state which guarantees a reason-
able minimum of socio-economic rights. They are particularly necessary in a period of
stormy economic transformation leading to a market economy." Malajny, supra note
43, at 17 (citing S. Geberthner, Modele system6w rzad6w a ich regulacja konstytucyjna [The
Models of the Systems of Government and Their Constitutional Regulation], paper delivered at
the XXXVI Conference of the Polish Chairs of Constitutional Law, Jachranka, June 9-
11, 1994 at 3, and Zygmunt. Ziembinski, Wartosci Konstytucyjne [Constitutional Values] at
71 (1993)).
150. Osiatynski observes that all constitutions in East Central Europe decided on
the solution to enforce some economic, social, and cultural rights judicially and to have
different safeguards for others. Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 140.
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under an obligation to provide basic economic and social entitle-
ments remained strong during the initial period of political and
economic transformation. 151 Juxtaposed against these aspira-
tions were the prevailing difficult economic conditions. The di-
lemma in deciding whether to constitutionalize economic and
social rights was described as follows:
[P]eople in Poland took these rights for granted. Leaving
them out could be interpreted as a betrayal of the people by
the elites. On the other hand, leaving these rights intact
would undermine the enforceability of the entire document,
for no one can miraculously implement social rights with an
empty budget and a bankrupt economy.
15 2
In October 1994, the Constitutional Commission raised the fol-
lowing questions for discussion in respect of the relationship be-
tween social rights and the socio-economic system:
First, are social rights to be entrenched as constitutional
rights, or should they be formulated only as important goals
of state policy? Second, should social rights be constitutional
or only statutory? Third, should social and economic rights,
as well as the leading principles of the economic policy, ap-
pear in the section enumerating the general principles of the
constitution, or, in the Charter of Human Rights and Free-
doms?1
53
A number of factors, however, made the constitutionaliza-
tion of such rights in Poland inevitable. These factors include
the tradition of state intervention in the economy, which pre-
151. In surveys carried out in 1988 and 1990, 91% and 71% of Poles, respectively,
were of the view that the state had a duty to secure permanent employment for every-
one in accordance with his or her skills. Similarly, 93% in 1988 and 95% in 1990 of
Poles believed that state authorities were under a duty to guarantee to everyone a mini-
mum survival income, pension, or benefit. SeeJACEK KURCZEWSKI, THE RESURRECrION OF
RIGHTS IN POLAND 426 (1997).
152. Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 31; see Balaban, supra note 10, at 508-09. In 1993,
Balabon wrote that:
The problem will be matching popular expectations regarding individual
rights with the economic resources available.... The new constitution must
deal with the inconsistencies among these expectations and current liberal
policy and economic forces. If the constitution guarantees these social rights,
it will create a significant problem for future government; if it does not an-
nounce these rights, many citizens of the country will be disappointed and
reluctant to fully recognize the validity of the constitution.
Balabon, supra.
153. See Constitution Watch: Poland, 4 EECR No. 1, 18 (1995).
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dates the communist regime and which is also evident in the
1921 Polish Constitution briefly discussed earlier; the questiona-
ble commitment of the Polish people to the market economy
after experiencing forty years of full employment; and the
profound union tradition in recent Polish politics on which the
"Solidarity" governments, from 1989 to 1993, were based.154
Moreover, as argued by Prof. Zbigniew Salwa in 1990, the formu-
lation of the fundamental social rights of citizens in the Constitu-
tion would illustrate the importance that the State assigns to
these rights and to their realization, emphasize the aims that illu-
minate the government's actions, and give these rights the value
of permanence. 55 Consequently, the principal question did not
really concern whether these rights should be excluded from the
fundamental law of the country, but rather the form that they
should take.
1 56
The proposals in the draft Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
submitted to Parliament by President Walesa in November 1992,
envisaged the separation of economic, social, and cultural rights
into two distinct categories: those justiciable or enforceable in
the courts regardless of the prevailing economic conditions and
those that the state was obliged to realize but that were non-justi-
ciable. The former category comprised the following rights and
freedoms: the right to education (including eight years free
public education); freedom of employment (not the right to
154. See Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 612.
155. Zbigniew Salwa, Praca oraz prawa socjalne obywateli w przyszlej konstytucji [Problem
of Labor and the Social Rights of Citizens in the Future Constitution], 45 PANSTWO I PRAWO
No. 9, at 13, 14 (1990). Salwa argued that although most social rights are already real-
ized in practice, particularly those relating to workers, and are concretized in ordinary
regulations, their removal from the rank of constitutional norms would have not only a
legal meaning, but also above all a socio-political expression; such an action would sig-
nify the position of the state towards the place and role of work in the new legal struc-
ture and its lack of interest in protecting those making a living from wage-earning la-
bor. Id. at 16. He observed that the omission of these rights from many constitutions of
Western countries could not be an argument for marginalizing them in the new Polish
Constitution, and he also noted that many of the new Western constitutions, such as the
Spanish Constitution of December 27, 1978, devote considerable attention to this issue.
Id. at 15. Moreover, contended Salwa, the ratification by Poland of international instru-
ments, such as the ICESCR, constituted an acceptance of the ideas in these instruments,
and their legal elucidation should be confirmed in the highest law. Id.
156. See Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 612-13 (referring to debates in 1990-1991
Constitutional Committee of Sejm); see also Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 140 (observing
that "[t]he real issue is not the inclusion of social and economic rights in constitutions
but the enforcement offered for such rights").
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work, but the freedom to choose a place of work and a profes-
sion); the right to safe working conditions; the right to free basic
medical care; and the right to social security. The latter category
was removed from rights language altogether and placed in a
separate chapter entitled, "Economic, Social and Cultural Tasks
of Public Authorities." This latter category included such bene-
fits as improvement of working conditions, full employment,
assistance to families, health care beyond the basic level, educa-
tion beyond the elementary level, protection of cultural heri-
tage, protection of consumers, and protection of the environ-
ment. 157  Prof. Wiktor Osiatynski argued at the time that the
message conveyed by this category was that "the Bill acknowl-
edges the importance of these benefits but does not offer them
judicial protection. The emphasis is on the active role of the
state, which is held responsible by political, not legal means for
the fulfillment of these tasks."15
The orientation of the new Polish Constitution towards the
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights is effectively
enshrined in Article 2 of the Constitution, discussed earlier,
which ordains the Republic of Poland to be "a democratic state
governed by law implementing the principles of social jus-
tice.""59 According to Prof. Andrzej Zoll, the former President
of the Constitutional Tribunal, this principle is the development
of the normative thought found in paragraph sixteen of the Pre-
157. See Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 31; Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 143-44;
Halmai, supra note 4, at 155-56. These rights and freedoms can be found in Chapter III
(arts. 29-33) and Chapter V (arts. 41-47) of the draft Charter.
158. Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 31. This approach was also justified by Professor
Geremek:
Social rights can be divided into enforceable rights that every citizen may
claim in court and the social tasks of the state. . . . The tasks of the state
should be carried out by all organs of the state, but above all by Parliament.
Parliament creates the government, evaluates it, and passes the budget. The
social tasks of the state belong to this sphere . . . . [T]he [Constitutional]
Tribunal should not be in a position to order the state to take actions for
which Parliament does not have economic resources.
See Wiktor Osiatynski, Bronislaw Geremek on Constitution-making in Poland: An Argument
Against Popular Ratification and for Chancellor Democracy, 4 EECR No. 1, 42, 43 (1995).
Article 48 of the draft Charter of Rights contained an obligation upon the government
to submit an annual report on the performance of each of these tasks. See Osiatynski,
supra note 29, at 144-45; Rzeplinski, supra note 54, at 29.
159. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 2. As observed above, this Rechtsstaat clause was in-
serted into the former socialist Constitution in 1989. See supra notes 59-62 and accom-
panying text.
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amble, which obliges all those applying the Constitution to do so
"paying respect to... [inter alia] the obligation of solidarity with
others .... 160 Moreover, the requirement that lawmakers un-
dertake an active social policy can be supported by the principle
in Article 30, which obliges public authorities to respect and to
protect the natural and inalienable dignity of human beings. 161
It is not surprising, therefore, to find a fairly comprehensive cat-
alogue of economic, social, and cultural rights in Chapter II, Ar-
ticles 64 through 76 of the Constitution.
The division of these rights into two categories in the draft
Charter of Rights is replicated, to some extent, in the new Polish
Constitution. Although, in principle, all these rights are en-
forceable, Article 81, in the section entitled "Means for the De-
fense of Freedoms and Rights," Articles 77 to 81, stipulates the
economic, social, and cultural rights that "can be asserted sub-
ject to limitations specified by law."1 62 This provision, therefore,
enables the legislature to restrict access to the constitutional
complaint mechanism in respect of a broad range of economic
and social rights. 6 Most of the rights concerned are phrased in
terms of constitutional directives to public authorities, and thus
it will not normally be possible to lodge a complaint arguing that
a policy is inappropriate. It has been argued, however, that in
extreme cases, for example if Parliament were to pass a law pre-
cluding the constructing of social housing, the relevant constitu-
tional norm should be justiciable before the Constitutional Tri-
bunal. 1 64
The new Polish Constitution adopts the approach of the
draft Charter of Rights to the concept of the right to work.
160. PoL. CONST. (1997) pmbl., 16.
161. Andrej Zoll, Bieda jako problem konstytucyjny [Poverty as a Constitutional Problem],
RZECZPOSPOLITA, Sept. 29, 1997.
162. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 77-81.
163. These rights include: Article 65(4), the right to a minimum level of remuner-
ation for work; Article 65(5), the state obligation to pursue policies aiming at full and
productive employment; Article 66, the right to safe and hygienic conditions of work
and the right to specified days free from work as well as annual paid holidays; Article 69,
the obligation of public authorities to provide aid to disabled persons; Article 71, the
right of families to special assistance from public authorities and the right of a mother,
before and after birth, to special assistance from public authorities; Article 74, the pro-
tection of the environment; Article 75, the obligation of public authorities to pursue
policies conducive to satisfying the housing needs of citizens; and Article 76, the protec-
tion of consumers.
164. Zoll, supra note 161.
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There is no specific constitutional formulation of this concept
from the standpoint of the individual citizen. Only "the free-
dom to choose and to pursue an occupation and to choose a
place of work" in Article 65(1) is recognized explicitly in this
manner.165 The "right to work," as addressed in Article 65(5), is
subsumed in the state progressive obligation to aim at "full, pro-
ductive employment by implementing programs to combat un-
employment... as well as public works and economic interven-
tion."'166 The formulation of the right to education in the Con-
stitution engendered lively discussion. Although the
Constitution guarantees a right to free education in public
schools, the imposition of "payments for certain services pro-
vided by public institutions of higher education" in Article 70(2)
is permissible if specified by law. 167 This approach was criticized
in a number of quarters, particularly by members of PSL and UP
who wished to see the introduction of an unambiguous provision
safeguarding the right to publicly-funded education at all levels,
including higher education.
168
The introduction, however, of a similarly watered-down pro-
vision concerning equal access to health care was thwarted. Arti-
cle 68(2) reads: "Equal access to health care services, financed
from public funds, shall be assured by public authorities to citi-
zens, irrespective of their material situation. The conditions for,
and scope of, the provision of services shall be established by
law."169 Originally, this provision only guaranteed equal access
to "basic" health care services, a position criticized as avoiding
the real issue of very expensive specialist care that could not be
165. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 65(1).
166. A state obligation merely to take action in order to combat unemployment
was viewed by some as rather weak in contrast to an individual right to work. See, e.g.,
Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (opinion of Sejm Deputy, Piotr
Ikonowicz (PPS)); id. (comments by Sejm Deputy Mieczyslaw Piecka (SLD), arguing for
stronger guarantees relating to right to work and curbing of unemployment).
167. Id. art. 70(2).
168. Id. (comments by Waldemar Pawlak, lreneusz Skubis, Tadeusz Slawecki
(PSL), Ryszard Bugaj (UP), Piotr Ikonowicz (PPS), and Wladyslaw Adamski (SLD)). In
the view of Sejm Deputy Adam Szczesny (PSL), the introduction of payment for higher
education conflicted with Article 65(1), which provides for the freedom [of everyone]
to choose and to pursue their occupation and to choose their place of work, because
access to the more lucrative professions, which demanded a more expensive education,
would depend on the affluence of the family. Id.; see Constitution Watch: Poland, 6 EECR
No. 1, 20, 21 (1997).
169. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 68(2).
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afforded by any citizen without recourse to public funds.
1 7 1
E. "Third-generation Rights". A Right to a Clean and
Healthy Environment?
In addition to protecting traditional civil and political
rights, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights, the Consti-
tution purports to safeguard an increasingly-important, so-called
"third-generation right," namely the human right to a clean and
healthy environment. Although agreement on the existence of
such a right in international law has yet to find definitive expres-
sion,"17 the urgency to include effective provisions concerning
the protection of the environment in the new Polish Constitu-
tion was understandable given the ecological degradation suf-
fered by Poland during the period of communist rule. 172 While
such a reference was inserted into the communist Constitution
in 1976, it was viewed, in accord with other basic laws in commu-
nist countries at the time, as a goal to be achieved rather than as
an enforceable right. 1
71
The specific provision concerned with the protection of the
environment is Article 74. It should be read together with Arti-
cle 5, discussed earlier in Part III, Section B, on General Princi-
ples, which obliges the Republic of Poland to protect "the natu-
ral environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable devel-
opment. ' 174 Although located in Chapter II of the Constitution
dealing with rights under the heading "Economic, Social and
Cultural Freedoms and Rights," Article 74, in line with some of
170. See Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (opinion Sen.
Zbigniew Religa (KSN)); see also id. (comments by Sejm Deputy Marek Balicki (UW),
arguing for formulating more precisely in Constitution that state health policy should
aim to guarantee equal access to medical care of appropriate quality).
171. For an overview of environmental rights, see M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
587-89 (4th ed. 1997).
172. For an overview of the protection of environmental rights in Eastern Euro-
pean Constitutions and an argument that such rights should be enforceable, see Eliza-
beth F. Brown, In Defense of Environmental Rights in East European Constitutions, U. CHI-
CAGO LAW 1993 SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 191.
173. Id. at 193-94. Article 71 of the 1952 Polish Constitution reads: "Citizens of
the Republic of Poland shall have the right to benefit from the natural environment
and it shall be their duty to protect it." POL. CONST. (1952) art. 71.
174. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 5. "Balanced" or sustainable development has been
defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development, appointed by
the United Nations General Assembly, as "development that meets current needs with-
out compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Brown,
supra note 172, at 192, (citing STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE 5-6 (1992)).
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the economic and social entitlements, is not phrased in individ-
ual human rights language, but rather in the terminology of
State duties.' 75 Article 74 begins, in its first paragraph, with the
following general statement: "Public authorities shall pursue
policies ensuring the ecological safety of current and future gen-
erations. '176 Article 74(2) underlines that the "protection of the
environment shall be the duty of public authorities.' 1 77 The
only direct reference to a "right" is found in the subsequent par-
agraph, Article 74(3), ensuring the right of everyone "to be in-
formed of the quality of the environment and its protection. "178
A further duty is incumbent on public authorities in Article
74(4) to "support the activities of citizens to protect and improve
the quality of the environment.' 71 9  It should be emphasized,
however, that judicially compelling public authorities to protect
the environment might prove to be a difficult task given that Ar-
ticle 74 falls into the category of rights' provisions in Article 81,
which may be asserted subject to limitations specified by stat-
ute. 80 Article 74 does not specify the kind of environment that
public authorities are obligated to protect. The link between en-
175. In contrast, other constitutions in the region clearly refer to environmental
protection as a "right." For example, Article 16 of the Hungarian Constitution states
that "[t]he Republic of Hungary recognises and implement's everyone's right to a
healthy environment." A MAGYOR KOZTARSASAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution] art. 16
(Hung.). Article 35 of the Czech Republic Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms states that "[elveryone has a right to a favourable environment." USTAVANi ZAKON
CESKft REPUBLIKY [Constitution] art. 35 (Czech Rep.). Article 55 of the Bulgarian Con-
stitution states that "[c]itizens shall have the right to a healthy and favourable environ-
ment corresponding to the established standards and norms." Konstitutiia [Constitu-
tion] art. 55 (Bulg.); see Brown, supra note 172, at 196, 198, 201.
176. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 74.
177. Id. art. 74(2).
178. Id. art. 74(3).
179. Id. art. 74(4).
180. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 81. In this respect, it is also worth noting that the
protection of the environment was included in the second category of non-justiciable
entitlements in the draft Charter of Rights. See Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 31. It has
been argued that conceiving environmental rights as economic and social rights leads
to doubts as to their justiciability, a problem that would be avoided if the former were
viewed as property rights. Indeed, this approach has been adopted in the United States
where environmental rights have evolved as property rights under the public trust doc-
trine, which provides that "citizens own or have a 'right' to those things committed to
the trusteeship of the state" and that "the state has a fiduciary duty as trustee to preserve
and protect this right." Brown, supra note 172, at 204 (citing A.E.D. Howard, State Con-
stitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193, 199 (1972)); see Note, Constitutional
Law and the Environment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commis-
sion, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1557, 1560 (1985).
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vironmental rights and health, however, is made in the Article
68(4) State duty to "prevent the negative health consequences of
degradation of the environment,""18 a clause to which Article 81
does not refer.
The importance of protecting the environment is also ac-
centuated elsewhere in the Constitution. Continuing the theme
of duties with reference to environmental matters, the final pro-
vision in Chapter II, Article 86, in the Section on Duties, declares
that "[e]veryone shall care for the quality of the environment
and shall be held responsible for causing its degradation .... "
Finally, it is clearly recognized that the importance assigned to
environmental protection may require the imposition of restric-
tions on other rights. The general limitations clause in Article
31(3) permits legal limitations on rights and freedoms where
necessary for, inter alia, "the protection of the natural environ-
ment," a ground that was not specified in the general limitations
provision in the 1992 draft Charter of Rights.
As observed during the latter stages of drafting, the constitu-
tional provisions concerned with the protection of the environ-
ment are far-reaching; they are in accordance with the demands
of the twenty-first century and are likely to serve as a model for
draft constitutions in other countries."8 2 Whether this optimistic
assessment will be realized will depend on whether the courts
181. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 68(4). In examining the provisions protecting the
environment in state constitutions in the United States, and the Illinois Constitution in
particular where the word "healthful" is used, Brown observes that:
The term 'healthful' was chosen over 'clean' because it describes the environ-
ment in terms of its direct effect on human life and because it was more flexi-
ble than a description in terms of physical characteristics which could be made
obsolete by the discovery of new pollutants. The phrase 'healthful environ-
ment' is meant to describe 'that quality of physical environment which a rea-
sonable man would select for himself were a free choice available.' This defi-
nition provides a standard that is easier for the courts to interpret than clean,
favourable or safe.
Brown, supra note 172, at 211-12. Brown also notes, however, that "the standard of
'healthful' is perhaps the least stringent of various qualifiers employed in U.S. state
constitutions. Substantial environmental degradation can occur before it begins to di-
rectly affect the health of human beings." Id. (citing Robert A. Helman, Constitutional
Commentary, III. Const. art. XI, at §1, §2 (1970), and RichardJ. Tobin, Some Observations
in the Use of State Constitutions to Protect the Environment, 3 BC ENviR. AFF. 472, 479
(1974)). Contrast also to comparable constitutional provisions in Bulgaria and Hun-
gary, supra note 175, which use the term "healthy."
182. Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comment by Sejm Dep-
uty Radoslaw Gawlik (UW)).
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and Constitutional Tribunal are ready to recognize the right to a
clean and healthy environment as an enforceable right.8 3 The
very general terms, however, in which this right is expressed, its
conceptualization in terms of duties, the specific provision for
limiting its justiciability by statute, coupled with political pres-
sure to give priority to pressing economic concerns, seem to con-
stitute the ideal ingredients for a watered-down and less-effective
interpretation.
18 4
F. Limitations on Rights
It is well-recognized, both conceptually and in international
human rights law, that rights and freedoms are not absolute and
that limitations upon their exercise can be justified. It is the way
such limitations are formulated, however, that is important.
Osiatynski outlines the criteria necessary to ensure that limita-
tions are not too widely drawn:
Principles of law require that such limitations not be arbi-
trary. The principle of constitutionalism demands that the
constitution itself must include the possibilities for such limi-
tations as well as state the reasons for which they can be im-
posed. It is also important that the limitations imposed on
the individual right in question be the least drastic method
needed to protect the societal value for which the limitation
is imposed.185
The provision in the new Polish Constitution permitting
limitations on rights and freedoms is Article 31(3), which states:
Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms
and rights may be imposed only by statute, and only when
183. Brown, supra note 172, at 214. Brown writes that:
a constitutional environmental provision would. be most enforceable if it is
placed in a Bill of Rights, if it codifies the public trust doctrine, if it uses lan-
guage which provides guidance to courts seeking to balance the environmen-
tal rights proclaimed against other rights and interests, and if it explicitly de-
clares its intention to grant the public standing to sue the government.
Id.
184. See Brown, supra note 171, at 194-96 (referring to October 1991 draft of Con-
stitution drawn up by Sejm's Constitutional Committee, which characterized this right
in Article 48 as universal duty to protect environment). Brown observes that the draft-
ers made the provision deliberately vague, as support for strong environmental meas-
ures declined in the wake of economic reforms resulting in unemployment and other
hardships. Brown concludes that such a provision contains none of the criteria and
would be "least likely to be enforced." Id. at 215.
185. Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 152.
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necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its secur-
ity or public order, or to protect the natural environment,
health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other
persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of free-
dom and rights.
Article 31 (3) conforms to the criteria described above. It is nar-
rowly drawn. Limitations may only be imposed by statute, when
necessary in a democratic state and on a number of specified
and exhaustive grounds.1 8 6 Moreover, this clause would only ap-
pear to apply to those provisions in Chapter II containing refer-
ences to permissible limitations by statute. Provisions that con-
tain no such references cannot be limited." 7 These include
"fundamental rights" that are considered non-derogable in inter-
national human rights law, such as the right to life and the right
to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.8 8 Furthermore, the Constitution, in
Chapter XI on Extraordinary Measures, specifies a broad range
of rights that cannot be derogated from in times of martial law
and states of emergency.1 8 9
Limitations on rights are also inherent in the Section on
Duties, found in Articles 82 through 86 in Chapter II of the Con-
stitution. 9 ' This emphasis on duties has been criticized on the
ground that it harks back to the socialist understanding of rights,
which makes rights conditional on the performance of duties,
and thus, that it is contrary to the very idea of natural or inher-
186. This list is longer than the one proposed in Article 5.2 of the draft Charter of
Rights, which did not include the grounds of protection of the "natural environment"
and "public morals." See Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 31; Rzeplinski, supra note 54, at
28.
187. See Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 156 (regarding earlier draft Charter of
Rights).
188. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 38, 40.
189. Id. art. 233(1). The following rights and freedoms cannot be limited in such
situations: the dignity of the person, id. art. 30, citizenship, id. arts. 34, 36, protection
of life, id. art. 38, humane treatment, id. arts. 39, 40, 41(4), ascription of criminal re-
sponsibility id. art. 42, access to a court, id. art. 45, personal rights, id. art. 47, con-
science and religion, id. art. 53, petitions, id. art. 63, and family and children, id. arts.
48, 72. Article 233(2) prohibits outright discriminatory practices under conditions of
martial law or states of emergency; forbidden are "[l] imitations of the freedoms and
rights of persons and citizens by reason of race, gender, language, faith or lack of it,
social origin, ancestry or property." Id. art. 233(2).
.190. Id. arts. 82-86. These duties are incumbent upon both citizens and aliens,
with the exception of the duty to defend the homeland, including the performance of
military service, which is limited to citizens. Id. art. 85.
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ent rights. A proposal was made, therefore, to draw a clear dis-
tinction between rights and duties by placing the latter in a dif-
ferent chapter of the Constitution, but this suggestion was re-
jected. 9 '
G. Implementation and Enforcement
1. Judicial Review
The concept of judicial review is usually understood by ref-
erence to the U.S. constitutional tradition whereby the judiciary
is given the power to declare legislation and other official enact-
ments invalid on constitutional grounds. In Europe, however,
this concept did not really take hold until well into the twentieth
century 92 because European countries historically viewed their
constitutions as symbolic documents rather than legal norms.'93
As discussed in Part I, Section D, limited judicial review in
Poland was only introduced in the 1980s'9 4 in the creation of
judicial bodies such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the High
Administrative Court, and was perceived by some observers at
the time largely as a lip-service response of the ruling Commu-
nist Party to demands for greater reform.'9g Nonetheless, the
191. See Osiatynski, supra note 29, at 127 (referring to his own suggestion to Sen-
ate's Constitutional Commission during 1990-1991 sessions).
192. Garlicki, supra note 35, at 713. The first Constitutional Tribunal in Europe
was introduced in Austria in 1920, but similar tribunals in other Western European
countries became only prevalent after World War II. These tribunals were based on the
Austrian model. Id. at 713-14. For the distinction between the Western European con-
stitutional tribunal and the U.S. (Anglo-Saxon) model of judicial review, see Garlicki,
supra note 35, at 714-15.
193. Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 608-09.
194. As noted by Carlicki, there was no judicial review in Poland before World War
II because the constitutional system in Poland was based on the French tradition, which
accorded supremacy to Parliament and precluded constitutional review of statutes by
thejudiciary. Garlicki, supra note 35, at 715, 717.
195. See, for example, the following view expressed by Frankowski in 1988:
How... may one explain the establishment of the Constitutional Tribunal in
Communist Poland? The explanation is fairly simple: due to the existing
political environment and the resulting extremely limited powers of the Tribu-
nal, the newly created body will never stand up in defense of a citizen against
the state power when fundamental and politically sensitive interests are at
stake. In short, the Tribunal is designed as a mechanism to improve the inter-
nal efficiency of the system, but not to challenge its most fundamental assump-
tions.
Stanislaw Frankowski, A Comment on Professor Garlicki's Article "Constitutional Developments
in Poland": The Lyrics Sound Familiar, But Are They Really Playing Our Song?, 32 ST. Louis
U. LJ. 737, 741 (1988).
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gradual introduction .of judicial review in Europe, particularly
since World War II, its inception in Poland in the 1980s, though
in a limited form, and the stark disjunction between constitu-
tional rights and freedoms and their enforcement during the
communist era were factors that convinced the drafters of the
Constitution that a stronger form of judicial review was neces-
sary.'9 6 As noted by the first Commissioner for Citizens' Rights,
Prof. Ewa Letowska, the new Polish Constitution marks a water-
shed in constitutional progress in Poland "because there has
been a sharp shift in emphasis from declaring rules to creating
mechanisms and guarantees. " 197
2. The Constitutional Tribunal: The First Ten Years
The increasing influence of the Constitutional Tribunal
since its inception is described in detail by Brzezinski and Gar-
licki.198 The Constitutional Tribunal came into being in 1985,
during the last few years of communist rule. It is not surprising,
therefore, that its scope of judicial review was deliberately lim-
ited for political reasons. First, it was prevented from reviewing
many legislative acts, such as local authority regulations and ordi-
nances. Moreover, it was unable to examine domestic legislation
with a view to assessing its compatibility with international legal
instruments, such as those concerned with the protection of
human rights. Second, the Tribunal could only consider laws
that came into force after the 1982 constitutional amendment
that brought it into being, a restriction effectively preventing the
review of past acts of questionable constitutional validity, such as
the Council of State Martial Law Decree of December 13, 1981.
Finally, only regulations issued by executive agencies or minis-
ters were subject to final and binding rulings by the Tribunal.
Parliamentary statutes, on the other hand, could not be automat-
ically invalidated. The Tribunal could only register a negative
decision with the Sejm, which then had to decide on the ruling
within six months. By mustering a two-thirds majority in the
presence of at least half of the Deputies, the Sejm could overturn
the decision by passing a resolution to that effect.' 99
196. Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 609-10.
197. Letowska, supra note 2, at 79.
198. Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 35.
199. Id. at 25-26; see Mark F. Brzezinski, Constitutionalism Within Limits: The New
NEW POLISH CONSTITUTION
From 1986 to 1989, the Tribunal's role was limited essen-
tially to ensuring that regulations issued by executive agencies
conformed to what was permissible under the Constitution and
parliamentary statutes.2"' In 1989, however, the Tribunal's
scope of review was expanded by constitutional amendments to
the 1985 legislation implementing the Tribunal. These amend-
ments, inter alia, enabled the President, prior to signature, to
submit a statute to the Tribunal in order to test its conformity
with the Constitution and permitted the Tribunal to provide
"universal binding interpretations of statutes," powszechnie
obowiazujaca uykladnia ustaw, the power to interpret ambiguous
legal provisions without the need for a specific case to arise. 2 1
Between 1989 and 1994, the Tribunal increased its activity by in-
terpreting statutes more aggressively, addressing controversial
constitutional issues such as religious instruction in schools and
abortion, and resorting to international law to assist it in the in-
terpretation of domestic law.20 2 Despite this more prominent
and active role, some of the Tribunal's controversial decisions
were inevitably plagued by politics. Parliamentary resolutions to
overrule or to uphold Tribunal rulings on the conformity of stat-
utes with the Constitution were frequently based on non-consti-
tutional considerations, a position exacerbated by Poland's diffi-
cult economic situation. 3
Constitutional Courts: Poland, 2 EECR No. 2, 38, 40 (1993); Garlicki, supra note 35, at
725-26, 728.
200. Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 35, at 27-30; Garlicki, supra note 35, at 729
(examining period from January 1, 1986 to March 15, 1988).
201. Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 35, at 24 n.54, 31 n.93 (citing Ustawa z dnia
29 maja 1989 o przekazaniu dotychczasowych kompetencji Rady Panstwa Prezydentowi
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej i innym organom panstwowym [Law of 29 May 1989 on the
Transfer of the Powers of the Council of State to the President of the Polish People's
Republic and to Other State Organizations], DZIENNIK USTAW UOURNAL OF LAws] No.
34, Item 178, at 549, 553-54 (arts. 19 and 19(3)) (1989)).
202. Id. at 32-34.
203. Id. at 46-47. Professor Zoll argues that the retention of the Sejm's power to
overturn Tribunal decisions after the changes of 1989-1990 was a remnant of a totalitar-
ian system characterized by its doctrine of uniform state law as well a violation of the
separation of powers principle. Andrej Zoll, Po r.'ferendum [After the Referendum],
RZECZPOSPOLITA, June 2, 1997. It should be noted, however, that this deference to par-
liamentary sovereignty was not only a result of the dominant position accorded by so-
cialist doctrine to Parliament, but also reflected a legal tradition based upon the French
model, which asserted the supremacy of parliamentary acts. Garlicki, supra note 35, at
715.
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3. The Constitutional Tribunal Under the New
Polish Constitution
The new Polish Constitution has expanded the standing of
the Constitutional Tribunal considerably. 20 4 First, the Tribunal
may now measure the conformity of statutes with ratified inter-
national agreements provided that ratification of these agree-
ments has first been consented to by Parliament in the form of a
statute.2 °5 Second, in adjudicating on the conformity of statutes
and other legal provisions with the Constitution,0 6 there is no
longer any time limit precluding the Tribunal's consideration of
laws passed before a certain date. Third, Article 190(1) stipu-
lates that "Ij] udgments of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be of
universally binding application and shall be final.
20 7
The effect of Article 190(1), however, is weakened consider-
ably by virtue of Article 239(1), which asserts that judgments of
the Tribunal in respect of statutes passed before the adoption of
the Constitution shall not be final for a period of two years. In
such cases, the former rules continue to apply and a decision of
the Tribunal declaring that such statutes violate the Constitution
may still be overturned by a two-thirds majority in the Sejm. 208
The justification for this provision was to ensure that Tribunal
decisions would not interfere with the government's work of pre-
paring draft laws implementing the Constitution. Under Article
236(1), the Council of Ministers is obliged, within two years of
the Constitution's entry into force, to present "to the Sejm such
bills as are necessary for the implementation of the Constitu-
204. The constitutional provisions are implemented by Ustawa z dnia 1 sierpnia
1997 r. o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym [The Constitutional Tribunal Act of 1 August
1997], DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAws] No. 102, Item 643 (1997) [hereinafter Con-
stitutional Tribunal Act 1997]. The great majority of the changes discussed below were
recommended in December 1992 by the General Assembly of the Tribunal (an annual
meeting of all the judges) at the request of Parliament's Constitutional Commission.
See Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 35, at 56-57.
205. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 188(2).
206. Id. arts. 188(1), (3).
207. Id. art. 190(1).
208. Under the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 1 August 1997 ("Constitutional Tri-
bunal Act of 1997"), a decision of the Tribunal referring to the non-conformity of a
statute to the Constitution is required to be considered by the Sejm within six months.
If the Sejm does not consider such a judgment or if it does not introduce amendments
to or repeal the provisions that are in non-conformity to the Constitution, the judgment
shall be final and result in the repeal of the provisions in question. Constitutional Tri-
bunal Act 1997, supra note 204, art. 89(2), (4).
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tion."2 9 This argument was criticized, however, by Professor
Zoll, who reasoned that immediately binding judgments of the
Tribunal, by eliminating laws in conflict with the Constitution,
can only have played a constructive role by speeding-up this pro-
cess. 210 A proposed amendment by the President to remove this
two-year period was not accepted by the National Assembly. 211
Although Article 190(3) declares that Tribunal judgments
are to take effect from the day of their publication, this provision
also contains an built-in delay mechanism enabling the Tribunal
to defer the effect of its judgments for up to eighteen months in
the case of a statute, and up to twelve months in the case of any
other normative act. 2 1 2 It has been argued that this delay mecha-
nism, based on the Austrian model, is a useful tool where the
effect of a judgment is to leave a gap in the law or has serious
consequences for the state budget.213 The power of delay, how-
ever, should not be exercised where it might adversely affect a
concrete case, namely an interested party or individual against
whom constitutional complaint proceedings have been taken or
a question of law raised by a court. 2 1 4
A fourth development concerns access to the Tribunal,
which has been expanded considerably.21 5 In addition to a
number of state bodies and officials, including the President and
the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights,2 16 who may apply to the
209. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 236(1).
210. Zoll, supra note 203.
211. Fourth Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2. This proposed
amendment was justified by the need to remove Poland from the small group of states
where the rulings of the Constitutional Court are not final. Id. (comments of Ryszard
Kalisz, the President's representative in the Constitutional Commission of the National
Assembly); see Constitution Watch: Poland, 6 EECR No. 1, 20, 22 (1997). According to
Sejm Deputy Tadeusz Mazowiecki (UW), the introduction of Article 239(1) of the new
Polish Constitution was without any basis given the existence of the possibility to defer
Tribunal judgments for up to 18 months. Fourth Session of the National Assembly,
supra note 2.
212. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 190(3).
213. Zoll, supra note 203. In the case of judgments that have financial conse-
quences not provided for in the budget, a political involvement is explicitly prescribed
by Article 190(3), whereby the Tribunal is obliged to consult with the Council of Minis-
ters before specifying the date on which the normative act in question is no longer to
apply.
214. Id.
215. For the previous position, see Garlicki, supro note 35, at 726-27 and Frankow-
ski, supra note 195, at 749.
216. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 191(1). Previously, the Commissioner was the most
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Tribunal, access is also granted to national organs of trade un-
ions, national authorities of employers' organizations and occu-
pational organizations, churches and religious organizations, 217
and individuals.2 1  Despite these broad locus standi rules, no
right of access to the Tribunal is granted explicitly to non-gov-
ernmental organizations ("NGOs") that are not occupationally
or religiously based. It would seem, therefore, that an opportu-
nity to extend the democratic base for constitutional challenge
has been missed. 219
Clearly, the new Polish Constitution makes the Constitu-
tional Tribunal central to the implementation of its provisions.
In the expanded role of the Tribunal, however, one important
aspect of its previous mandate has been removed, namely the
power to deliver "generally binding interpretations of statutes,"
powszechnie obowiazujaca wykladnia ustaw.22° The removal of this
power has been criticized by Professor Zoll, who argues that its
availability was necessary to resolve doubts regarding the mean-
ing of a binding law, particularly if there was no uniform judicial
interpretation.22 1
Another criticism relates to the method by which judges are
appointed to the Constitutional Tribunal. In this respect, Article
194(1) reads: "The Constitutional Tribunal is composed of 15
judges chosen individually by the Sejm for a term of office of 9
years from amongst persons distinguished by their knowledge of
active among all the institutions empowered to submit petitions to the Constitutional
Tribunal. See Letowska, supra note 37, at 64.
217. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 191(4)-(5).
218. Id. art. 191(6); see id. art. 79.
219. It has been argued that the need to liberalize standing rules, particularly in
the case of NGOs, constitutes an important strategy in overcoming the traditional polit-
ical limitations of public interest law in post-communist societies. See D. Petrova, Polit-
ical and Legal Obstacles to the Development of Public Interest Law: Postcommunist Challenges to
LegalAdvocacy and Reform, 5 EECR No. 4, 62, 70-71 (1996). Compare the standing rules
in Poland to the broad rights of access to the activist Constitutional Court in Hungary.
Article 32A(3) of the amended Hungarian Constitution reads simply: "In the cases
defined by the law, anyone may initiate proceedings at the Constitutional Court." See
Hungarian Constitution, supra note 175, art. 32A(3); Constitutional Symposium, supra
note 62, at 98.
220. See POL. CONST. (1997) art. 239(3) (stating that "[o]n the day on which the
Constitution comes into force, resolutions of the Constitutional Tribunal on interpreta-
tion of statutes shall lose their universally binding force"); see also Spiewak, supra note
56, at 94; Zoll, supra note 203.
221. Andrej Zoll, Klopoty z wykladnia [Difficulties with Interpretation], RZECZPOS-
POLITA. Nov. 24. 1997.
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the law. No person may be chosen for more than one term of
office." '22 2 Therefore, judges are to be appointed by the Sejm
and do not receive tenure for life. On one hand, this provision
may be viewed as playing into the hands of a Sejm, wishing to
exert political influence on the composition of the Tribunal.223
Indeed, the political bickering that erupted over whether three
new judges should be elected before or after the September
1997 parliamentary elections is an example of the continued
politicization of the Constitution in Poland. 224  On the other
hand, it may be argued that this provision also ensures that a
Sejm dominated by one particular political ideology cannot ex-
ert its influence beyond a prescribed period of time.2 2 5
4. Individual Challenges to Rights' Violations
An impressive and distinguishing feature of Chapter II is
the number of diverse mechanisms by which individuals can as-
222. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 194(1); see Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997, supra
note 204, art. 5(4) (adding that candidates for office of judge are to be nominated by at
least 50 Sejm deputies or Presidium of Sejm). A simple majority of votes in the pres-
ence of at least half of the total number of deputies is required for their election.
223. See Spiewak, supra note 56, at 94.
224. The new Polish Constitution increases the membership of the Tribunal from
12 to 15judges. The former SLD-PSL ruling coalition wished to appoint the three new
judges before the elections to ensure that the Tribunal would be operating at optimal
capacity when the Constitution came into force on October 17, 1997. If this had oc-
curred, it would have meant that most of the Tribunal's judges-lI out of 15-today
would have been appointed by the previously leftist-controlled Sejm. SeeJ. Pilczynski,
Dyktat czy zgoda [A Dictate or Consensus], RZECZPOSPOLITA, Aug. 20, 1997. In the end, the
new judges were elected by the newly constituted Sejm with the result that they all
obtained the approval of the AWS-UW governing coalition. Tzej nowi sedziowie [Three
New Judges], RZECZPOSPOLITA, Nov. 13, 1997.
225. Originally, the Sejm was also to have control over the appointment of the
Tribunal's President and Vice-President. The Sejm's role in this respect was seen as
constituting an unnecessary political intrusion into the principle of judicial indepen-
dence, and a presidential amendment to transfer this task to the Presidency was ac-
cepted by the National Assembly in Article 194(2) of the Constitution. Fourth Session
of the National Assembly, supra note 2; see id. (comments of Sejm Deputy Longin Pastu-
siak). The amendment was justified by Ryszard Kalisz, the President's representative in
the Constitutional Commission, as forming part of the Presidential duty to act as the
guardian of the Constitution. This duty could only be fulfilled if it included the instru-
ments necessary for its realization, hence the need for the prerogative to appoint per-
sons exercising key judicial powers. Id. On the other hand, it was also argued that this
transfer would not necessarily free the decision on appointments from politics because
a President could never be politically neutral. See id. (comments by Sejm DeputyJerzy
Gwizdz (PP)). The President is also responsible for appointing the presidents of the
Supreme Court and the High Administrative Court from candidates proposed by the
respective General Assemblies of judges. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 183(3), 185.
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sert their rights, outlined in the section "Means for the Defense
of Freedoms and Rights" (Articles 77-81) .226 This process is as-
sisted greatly by Article 8(2), which declares that "[t]he provi-
sions of the Constitution apply directly, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise. "227 First, by virtue of Articles 77 and 78 re-
spectively, any person can pursue a claim alleging an infringe-
ment of rights and freedoms in the ordinary courts, including
the right to claim compensation for any harm done by a public
authority, and every party in a court action is given the right to
appeal against judgments and decisions made at first instance.
Second, with the exception of aliens applying for asylum under
Article 56, a final appeal lies to the Constitutional Tribunal
under Article 79:
Anyone whose constitutional freedoms or rights have been in-
fringed, has the right to appeal in accordance with principles
specified by law to the Constitutional Tribunal for its judg-
ment on the conformity with the Constitution of a law, or an-
other normative act upon which basis a court or organ of
public administration has made a final decision on his free-
doms or rights or on his obligations specified in the Constitu-
tion.2 2 8
The right of individuals to bring a constitutional complaint has
been described as a revolution in the Polish legal system. 229 This
right, however, is circumscribed in a number of ways. First, it
can only be exercised after the court or administrative organ in
question has reached a final decision, which is often a long and
drawn-out process. 2 0 Second, if interpreted literally, it is only
the right to complain about the unconstitutionality of a legal act
rather than the unconstitutionality of its legal interpretation by
another judicial decision. 231' Third, the complaint must be
226. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 77-81. Similar mechanisms were found in the draft
Charter of Rights (arts. 34-38). See Osiatynski, supra note 27, at 32; Rzeplinski, supra
note 54, at 29.
227. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 8(2); see Osiatynski, supra note 2, at 74.
228. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 79.
229. Third Session of the National Assembly, supra note 2 (comment by Sejm Dep-
utyJanusz Niemcewicz (UW)).
230. L. Falandysz, Zbyt silny Sqjm [A Too Powerful Sejm], ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Oct. 18,
1997.
231. Letowska, supra note 2, at 80; see Spiewak, supra note 56, at 94. The narrower
interpretation is supported by Zoll. See Andrej Zoll, Jeszcze o skardze konstytucyjnej [On the
Subject of the Constitutional Complaint Once More], RZECZPOSPOLITA, Oct. 27, 1997.
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brought within two months of this final decision and must be
drawn up by a lawyer.2" 2 Finally, a judgment of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal finding a legal measure not in conformity with
the Constitution does not automatically invalidate a judicial or
administrative decision based on that measure. Proceedings will
have to be reopened before the appropriate forum.23 3
Another mechanism by which individuals may assert their
rights and freedoms is the right to bring a complaint to the
Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, under Article 80, "for assist-
ance in protection of [the] freedoms or rights infringed upon by
organs of public authority."234 The retention of the right to
complain to the Ombudsman was seen as an invaluable tool to
those vulnerable persons "who, on their own, lack the ability or
the means to protect themselves against injustice and abuse from
state authorities. '235  Clearly, the adoption of the new Polish
Constitution will increase the importance of the role of the Con-
232. Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997, supra note 204, arts. 46(1), 48(1); see Zoll,
supra note 231.
233. POL. CONST. (1997) art. 190(4). The Constitutional Tribunal Act 1997 re-
quires that an application to reopen administrative or civil proceedings be made within
one month from the day the Tribunal's decision comes into force. Constitutional Tri-
bunal Act 1997, supra note 204, arts. 82(2), 83(2). See Zoll, supra note 231. However,
this requirement does not apply to criminal cases. Zoll has argued that in the case of a
constitutional complaint the right to reopen proceedings should have been restricted
to the complainant. Otherwise, the Tribunal's judgment might lead to a flood of appli-
cations to reopen proceedings in respect ofjudicial and administrative decisions made
on the basis of the measure that was declared unconstitutional. Id.
234. POL. CONST. (1997) arts. 80. The Constitution also refers to a Commissioner
for Children's Rights. Article 72(4), which is located in the section on economic and
social rights in Chapter II, reads simply: The law defines "the competence and proce-
dure for [the] appointment of the Commissioner for Children's Rights." Id. art. 72(4).
The brevity of this provision and its deference to statute suggest that it is unlikely that
the Commissioner, when created, will be able to initiate constitutional complaints on
behalf of children. It has been argued that this clause is vague and hollow because it
does not define the mandate and functions of the post and may undermine the author-
ity of other institutions, such as the Ombudsman, if its role replicates the work of the
latter. See Nowicki, supra note 3; P. Winczorek, Bez rewolucji [No Revolution], Zvcta WAR-
szAwv, Oct. 18, 1997.
235. Osiatynski, supra note 2, at 74. The important role played by the Commis-
sioner for Citizens' Rights regarding the protection of rights and freedoms in Poland
was underlined by the former Commissioner, Tadeusz Zielinski (1992-1996), who re-
ported that his office received 178,000 letters between February 13, 1992 and March 22,
1996. During this period, the Commissioner lodged 69 motions before the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, receiving favorable rulings in 25 out of 36 cases considered on their
merits. Wystapienie Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich przed Sejmem RP [The Speech Delivered by
the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights Before the Sem of the Republic of Poland], 51 PANsTwo I
PRAwo No. 6, at 3, 9 (1996).
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stitutional Tribunal, and is expected to result, at least initially, in
a flood of litigation.23 6 The instigation of the right of individual
complaint and the need to interpret broad provisions such as
Article 20, which declares that the basis of the economic system
of Poland is to be a "social market economy," as well as detailed
provisions in what is an extensive basic law, means that the task
facing the Tribunal is a considerable one.23 7
CONCLUSION
The results of the Polish parliamentary elections on Sep-
tember 21, 1997, mean that the political climate in the country
has changed yet again. The SLD-PSL alliance has been replaced
by a new coalition ("AWS-UW"), with common roots harking
back to the Solidarity Labor Union. Promises have been made,
particularly by AWS, the dominant coalition partner, to amend
the Constitution. 23' The number of seats held by the coalition
partners, 239 however, is insufficient to gain the two-thirds major-
ity in the Sejm that would be required to pass constitutional
amendments.
240
236. See Letowska, supra note 2, at 81 (noting that judicial system in Poland is
presently overburdened with cases). Clearly, if no steps are taken to resolve this prob-
lem, the Constitutional Tribunal might experience difficulties in performing its func-
tion. Professor Spiewak observes that 'Judicial protection of the rights of individuals
will be very difficult and time-consuming because of the current inefficiencies of courts.
The Constitution fails to address this in any respect." Spiewak, supra note 56, at 94-95.
237. A. Bisztyga, Nowa Konstytucja, Spotkanie z Wicemarszalkiem Sejmu RP
Markiem Borowskim (G6rnoslaska Wyzsza Szkola Handlowa, Katowice, 16.05.1997 r.)
[New Constitution, Meeting with the Vice-Marshall of the Sejm, Marek Borowski (Upper
Silesia Higher School of Business, Katowice, 16 May 1997)], Prawa Czlowieka - Humanis-
tyczne Zeszyty Naukowe [Human Rights - Humanistic Scientific Fascicles] No. 4 (12), 194,
194 (1997).
238. Constitution Watch: Poland, 6 EECR Nos. 2-3, 25, 26 (1997).
239. AWS and UW won 261 and 60 seats, respectively, whereas the former gov-
erning coalition obtained 191 seats (SLD-164; PSL-27). RzFCZPOSPOLITA, Sept. 26, 1997.
240. See POL. CONST. (1997) art. 235. Article 235 of the new Polish Constitution is
located in Chapter XII, entitled "Amending the Constitution." Under this provision,
before an amendment can be adopted, a two-thirds majority in the Sejm in the pres-
ence of at least 50% of the Deputies is required and the amendment also has to secure
an absolute majority in the Senate in the presence of at least 50% of the Senators within
60 days. Id. art. 235(2)-(3). Amendments can only be proposed by one-fifth of Sejm
deputies, the Senate, or the President. Id. art. 235(1). Furthermore, it should be noted
that if amendments concern provisions in Chapters I (The Republic), II (Rights), or
XII (Amendments), the proposer may apply to the Marshal of the Sejm for a referen-
dum to be held. The amendment is then accepted if a majority of those voting approve
it. Id. art. 235(6). In each case, the amendment has to be signed by the President. Id.
art. 235(7). As noted by Osiatynski, the possibility of holding a referendum before
NEW POLISH CONSTITUTION
The circumstances under which the Constitution was
adopted resemble, at least in one respect, those of 1791 Polish
Constitution. That earlier constitution marked the beginnings
of an evolutionary process that would have probably peacefully
led Poland in its transition from a feudal to a modern society but
for the forceful intervention of foreign powers. In that sense, it
differed markedly from the revolutionary French Constitution of
that era. Similarly, the evolutionary process underlining the
present text, which delayed its adoption, may well also turn out
to be its savior. Certainly, as far as the domain of human rights is
concerned, the letter of the constitutional document is innova-
tive and far-reaching. But it would be advisable to wait first and
to see how the protection of human rights in the new Polish
Constitution works out in practice. For the time being at least, it
remains a "Constitution of Possibilities. 24'
embarking on changes to Chapter II ensures that "the rights and freedoms of citizens
are better protected against parliamentary changes than the rest of the Constitution."
Osiatynski, supra note 2, at 76.
241. Letowska, supra note 2, at 79. Letowska writes that "the Constitution eludes
immediate evaluation. It remains a Constitution of Possibilities and is not yet the last word
in Polish constitutionalism. It gives hope for the future, but remains a constitution of
possibilities 'only.' Evaluating whether this mechanism-oriented approach will work in
practice can be done only tentatively." Id.
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